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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consist of five articles: 2. Habermas and the Problem of 
Indoctrination, 3. Reviving the Gadamer-Habermas Debate in the Con-
text of Theory of Indoctrination, 4. Between Facts and Norms - Action 
Research in the Light of Jürgen Habermas’s Theory of Communicative 
Action and Discourse Theory of Justice, 5. Teaching and the Dialectic of 
Recognition, and 6. Critical Adult Education and the Political-Philosoph-
ical Debate between Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth. Articles 4 and 5 are 
written together with docent Hannu L.T. Heikkinen.
Articles 2, and 3 deal the question of socialization and indoctrina-
tion. Indoctrination can be defined as infiltrating (drilling, inculcating 
etc.) concepts, attitudes, beliefs, and theories into a pupil’s or student’s 
mind by passing her free and critical deliberation. Form the perspec-
tive of the modern Western worldview, the education in accordance 
with mechanical solidarity can be described with the term indoctrina-
tion. Mechanical solidarity prevails in traditional society and socializa-
tion in traditional society tends to produce a static form of personality, 
which I call a traditional personality. Mechanical solidarity means sol-
idarity between those individuals who think alike, act alike, have the 
same value system, speak the same language, etc. It is intolerant, doc-
trinaire and prejudiced. In a traditional society, highly individual per-
sonalities are perceived as a threat, not as a resource or potential. 
Education and socialization in this traditional – i.e. indoctrinative – 
sense does not aim at an individual and autonomous personality. It 
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aims at traditional persons who think, speak, act, believe, etc. alike, 
and fear and dream the same things. In a traditional society, there is 
only one model of good life, and education is based on that model. 
According to Durkheim, in a society of mechanic solidarity there is 
very little room for individual thinking – that is, individual conscious-
ness. In modern societies, identities are open to a certain extent. In a 
modern society, educational institutions leave or at least should leave 
the identity of an individual open. Modern personality is a kind of per-
son who is capable of forming a critically reflective relation to tradi-
tion and can to a certain extent critically evaluate interpretations that 
the tradition consists of. The basic claim in the critical theory of soci-
ology of education is that indoctrinative education prevents the for-
mation of the modern personality and thus also prevents social criti-
cism and critique of ideology. 
The problem when educating modern personality is following: Where 
does autonomy come from if young pupils are not communicatively com-
petent to critically evaluate the content of tradition? If critical learning 
requires critical evaluation and reflection of the tradition, a communica-
tively incompetent learner is unable to learn critically. Through what kind 
of learning process is a critical and communicatively competent subject 
formed? Asking this question is the same as asking how Bildung is possi-
ble. For this purpose, I have constructed a model of communicative teach-
ing which tries to preserve the idea of critical learning while recognizing 
the authority of the teacher and tradition. 
I define communicative teaching as including the value orienta-
tions by which the teacher commits herself to the “universal” presup-
positions of argumentation and acts in accordance with these maxims 
as to the best of her ability. The phrase “as to the best of her ability” 
is needed because the pedagogical relationship can never be “symmet-
rical”. The best a teacher can do is to act as if the pupils were com-
municatively competent speakers. Of course, the pupils aren’t fully 
communicatively competent speakers, and that is why communica-
tive teaching can never be the same as communicative action in the 
Habermasian sense. Nevertheless, a teacher must make an effort to 
orientate her actions towards communicative action and not towards 
strategic action. I claim that pedagogical communication is a kind of 
simulated communicative action and it is more simulated in the early 
stage of education.
vArticle 4 deals the question what could be a democratic way to cre-
ate action norms in schools which at the same time could serve as the 
didactic of participatory democracy? In this article Huttunen & Heik-
kinen apply Habermas’s discourse theory of justice into democratic 
school management in order to find valid action norms. In his book 
Between Facts and Norms, Habermas develops the so-called process 
model of ideal rational will-formation. This model can be applied into 
school management. Habermas’s discourse theory of justice and model 
of ideal rational will-formation relies on the universal presuppositions 
of argumentation. From these presuppositions, Habermas deduces the 
so-called universality principle U and discourse principle D:
U: Norm is valid if all affected can accept the consequences and 
side effects its general observance can be anticipated to have for 
the satisfaction of everyone’s interests.
D: Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could 
meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as partic-
ipants in a practical discourse.
In a school “all affected in” includes, for example, the teachers, the par-
ents and the pupils. Habermas’s discourse principle implies that pupils 
should also have the possibility to participate in the practical discourse 
insofar as their capacity to communicative action allows it. Of course, 
there will be great difficulties organizing a practical discourse in the 
Habermasian sense in a school. Seven year old pupils’ communica-
tive competency for practical discourse is almost nonexistent. On the 
other hand, fifteen year old pupils have greater communicative skills 
than generally is expected. 
Articles 5 and 6 deal with the theme of recognition in education and 
in the political action of critical adult education. The thing which Hut-
tunen & Heikkinen call the positive circle of recognition is the ideal case 
of reciprocal relation of recognition. In the positive circle of recognition, 
trust, loyalty and spirit are constructed through a reciprocal relation of 
recognition. Everybody works for the common good, because they have 
achieved the experience that their contribution is needed and important. 
When somebody in the community gains success and receives recognition, 
others also take pleasure in it, because somebody else’s success and recog-
nition is not “off from me” but quite contrary. The success of one creates 
possibilities for the others in the community, and one’s success is related 
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to previous successful contributions of other members of the community. 
A positive circle of recognition creates a strong feeling of solidarity which 
on the level of the state makes participatory democracy and active citizen-
ship both possible and desired. Unfortunately, a negative and destructive 
circle of recognition usually prevails on the global, national and local lev-
els. The situation in a negative circle of recognition resembles a Sartrean 
queue in which individuals are waiting on a line for some goods. Every-
body in the queue hopes that the next person will drop out, and every-
body takes care that the person behind her will not overhaul. This kind 
of a Sartrean queue is created both by social structures and learned per-
sonal attitudes.
In this respect, the nature of the learning community in which indi-
viduals learn basic attitudes towards meaningful others and towards 
strangers is very crucial. If the learning community itself works in line 
with the positive circle of recognition, it gives the learner a good per-
sonal disposition (habitus) for participating in democratic procedures 
and cooperative work. If the competitive spirit of the learning commu-
nity resembles more a negative circle of recognition, then the prospects 
for participating in democratic institutions, and the future of demo-
cratic institutions itself, are in a bad shape.
Also critical adult education should itself work like a learning com-
munity in which the positive circle of recognition prevails and subjects 
aim at unforced common meanings. If a community of adult educa-
tion (study group) itself works in an undemocratic way and if some-
one in that community (for example a teacher, an intellectual, an aca-
demically educated person, etc.) holds more authority and a more rec-
ognized voice than others, then the community just reinforces a social 
hierarchy instead of empowering itself. To teach critique of ideology 
with the attitude that only a teacher can really see behind the ideology 
means the same thing as trying to indoctrinate democracy. Of course, 
in an adult education group – if there is a teacher – the teacher holds 
some epistemological authority, but fundamentally his or her view of 
society and politics is not more correct that anyone else’s. Also, in crit-
ical adult education we should avoid indoctrination and follow the 
idea of a communicative teaching in which the teacher and the learn-
ers together participate in the creation of a common meaning. Only 
on this foundation, critical adult education can inspire persons for 
authentic political action both in the sense of politics of recognition 
and politics of redistribution.
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TIIVISTELmÄ
Väitöskirjaan kuuluu viisi artikkelia: This dissertation consist of five 
articles: 2. Habermas and the Problem of Indoctrination, 3. Reviving 
the Gadamer-Habermas Debate in the Context of Theory of Indoctri-
nation, 4. Between Facts and Norms - Action Research in the Light of 
Jürgen Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action and Discourse 
Theory of Justice, 5. Teaching and the Dialectic of Recognition ja 
6. Critical Adult Education and the Political-Philosophical Debate 
between Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth.  Artikkelit 4 ja 5 on kirjoi-
tettu yhdessä dosentti Hannu L.T. Heikkisen kanssa.
Artikkelit 2 ja 3 käsittelevät sosialisaation ja indoktrinaation 
teemoja. Indoktrinaatio voidaan määritellä käsitteiden, asenteiden, 
uskomusten ja teorioiden iskostamiseksi oppilaan tai opiskelijan 
mieleen ohittaen hänen vapaa ja kriittinen harkinta. Modernin länsi-
maalaisen maailmankuvan näkökulmasta mekaanisen solidaarisuuden 
hengessä tapahtuva opetus voidaan nähdä indoktrinaationa. Meka-
aninen solidaarisuus vallitsee perinteisessä yhteiskunnassa ja sosialisaa-
tio sellaisessa yhteiskunnassa tendenssimäisesti tuottaa staattista per-
soonallisuuden muotoa, jota minä kutsun traditionaaliseksi persoon-
aksi. Mekaaninen solidaarisuus tarkoittaa solidaarisuutta niiden kes-
ken, jotka ajattelevat samalla tavoin, toimivat samalla tavoin, jakavat 
saman arvomaailman, puhuvat samaa kieltä ja niin edespäin. Se on 
luonteeltaan suvaitsematonta, doktrinaalista ja ennakkoluuloista. Tra-
ditionaalisessa yhteiskunnassa pitkälle yksilöllistyneet persoonat näh-
dään uhkaksi eikä resurssiksi ja voimavaraksi.
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Kasvatus ja sosialisaatio traditionaalisessa eli indoktrinatiivisessa 
mielessä ei tähtää yksilölliseen ja autonomiseen persoonallisuuteen. 
Se tähtää traditionaaliseen persoonallisuuteen, joka ajattelee, puhuu, 
uskoo, pelkää ja unelmoi samoja asioita kuin muutkin. Traditionaali-
sessa yhteiskunnassa on vain yksi hyvän elämän malli ja kasvatus perus-
tuu tähän malliin. Durkheimin mukaan mekaanisen solidaarisuuden 
yhteiskunnassa on hyvin vähän sijaa yksilölliselle ajattelulle eli yksilöl-
liselle tietoisuudelle. Modernissa yhteiskunnassa identiteetit ovat avoi-
mia tiettyyn rajaan saakka. Modernissa yhteiskunnassa kasvatukselliset 
instituutiot jättävät tai ainakin niiden pitäisi jättää yksilön identiteetti 
avoimeksi. Moderni persoona on sellainen persoona, joka on kykene-
väinen muodostamaan kriittis-reflektiivisen suhteen traditioon ja voi 
tiettyyn rajaan saakka kriittisesti arvioida niitä tulkintoja, joista tradi-
tio koostuu. Kriittisen teorian kasvatussosiologian perusväite on, että 
indoktrinoiva kasvatus ehkäisee modernin persoonan muodostumista 
ja näin myös ehkäisee yhteiskunta- ja ideologiakritiikkiä. 
Modernin persoonan kasvattamisen ongelma on seuraava: Mistä 
autonomia tulee, jos nuoret oppilaat eivät ole kommunikatiivisesti 
kompetentteja kriittisesti arvioimaan tradition sisältöä? Jos kriittinen 
oppiminen vaatii tradition kriittistä ja reflektiivistä arvioimista, kom-
munikatiivisesti epäkompetentti oppija on kykenemätön kriittiseen 
oppimiseen. Minkälaisen oppimisprosessin kautta kriittinen ja kom-
munikatiivisesti kompetentti subjekti syntyy? Tämän kysymyksen esit-
täminen on samaa kuin kysyä, kuinka Bildung on mahdollista. Tätä 
silmällä pitäen olen kehittänyt mallin kommunikatiivisesta opettami-
sesta, jossa yritetään edesauttaa kriittistä oppimista tunnustaen kuiten-
kin opettajan ja perinteen auktoriteetti.
Määrittelen kommunikatiiviseen opettamiseen kuuluvaksi sellai-
sen arvo-orientaation, jossa opettaja sitoutuu argumentatiivisen toi-
minnan yleisiin ehtoihin ja toimii niiden mukaisesti parhaan kykynsä 
mukaan. Fraasi ”parhaan kykynsä mukaan” on tarpeen, koska peda-
goginen suhde ei voi koskaan olla ”symmetrinen”. Parasta mitä opet-
taja voi tehdä, on käyttäytyä, kuin oppilaat olisivat kommunikatiivi-
sesti kompetentteja puhujia. Tietenkään oppilaat eivät ole täysin kom-
munikatiivisesti kompetentteja puhujia ja siksi kommunikatiivinen 
opettaminen ei koskaan voi olla sama asia kuin kommunikatiivinen 
toiminta habermasilaisessa mielessä. Kuitenkin opettajan on ponnis-
teltava orientoidakseen toimintansa kommunikatiiviseen toimintaan 
eikä strategiseen toimintaan. Väitän, että pedagoginen kommunikaa-
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tion on eräänlaista simuloitua kommunikatiivista toimintaa ja sen sitä 
enemmän simuloitua, mitä nuorempia oppilaat ovat.
 Artikkeli 4 käsittelee kysymystä siitä, mikä voisi olla demokraatti-
nen tapa luoda toiminta normit kouluihin tavalla, joka samaan aikaan 
voisi toimia osallistuvan demokratian didaktiikkana. Tässä artikke-
lissa Huttunen & Heikkinen soveltavat Habermasin oikeuden dis-
kurssiteoriaa koulun demokraattiseen hallintoon validien toimintanor-
mien löytämiseksi. Kirjassaan Faktizität und Geltung Habermas kehit-
tää niin sanotun rationaalisen tahdonmuodostuksen ideaalin prosessi-
mallin. Tätä malli voidaan soveltaa koulun hallinnointiin. Tämä malli 
nojaa argumentatiivisen toiminnan yleisiin ehtoihin, joista Habermas 
dedusoi universaalisuus prinsiipin U ja diskurssiprinsiipin D:
U: Normi pätee, jos kaikki sen vaikutuspiirissä olevat voivat 
hyväksyä sen seuraukset ja sivuvaikutukset, jotka ovat yleisesti 
nähtävissä.  
D: Vain niitä normeja voidaan pitää pätevinä, jotka kaikki vaiku-
tuspiirissä olevat hyväksyvät (tai voisivat hyväksyä) praktisessa 
diskurssissa, johon he osallistuvat kapasiteettinsa mukaisesti.
Kouluissa vaikutuspiiriin kuuluvat muun muassa opettajat, vanh-
emmat ja oppilaat. Habermasin diskurssiperiaate implikoi sen, että 
oppilailla pitäisi myös olla mahdollisuus osallistua praktiseen dis-
kurssiin niin paljon, kuin heidän kapasiteettinsa kommunikatiiviseen 
toimintaan antaa myöten. Tietenkin on suuria vaikeuksia organisoida 
kouluissa habermasilainen praktinen diskurssi. 7-vuotiailla oppilailla 
praktiseen diskurssiin vaadittava kommunikatiivinen kompetenssi on 
lähes olematon. Toisaalta 15-vuotiailla oppilailla on suuremmat kom-
munikatiiviset taidot kuin yleisesti oletetaan.   
Artikkeleissa 5 ja 6 käsitellään tunnustuksen teemaa opetuksessa ja 
kriittisen aikuiskasvatuksen poliittisessa toiminnassa. Asia jota Huttu-
nen & Heikkinen kutsuvat tunnustuksen positiiviseksi kehäksi on vas-
tavuoroisten tunnustussuhteiden ideaalitapaus. Tunnustuksen positii-
visessa kehässä luottamus, lojaalisuus ja henki muodostuvat tunnustuk-
sen vastavuoroisten suhteiden kautta. Kaikki työskentelevät yhteisen 
hyvän eteen, koska heillä kaikilla on kokemus siitä, että heidän panok-
sensa on tarpeellinen ja tärkeä. Kun joku yhteisössä saavuttaa menes-
tystä ja tunnustusta, myös muut nauttivat siitä, koska tämä toisen saa-
vuttama menestys ja tunnustus eivät ole poissa keneltäkään muulta 
vaan päinvastoin. Yhden menestys luo mahdollisuuksia muille yhtei-
xsössä ja yhden menestyksen taustalla on muiden menestykset aikaisem-
min. Tunnustuksen positiivinen kehä luo voimakkaan solidaarisuuden 
tunteen, joka valtion tasolla tekee osallistuvan demokratian ja aktii-
visen kansalaisuuden sekä mahdolliseksi että toivotuksi. Valitettavasti 
tunnustuksen negatiivinen ja destruktiivinen kehä tavallisesti vallitsee 
niin globaalisti, kansallisesti kuin paikallisestikin. Tilanne tunnustuk-
sen negatiivisessa kehässä muistuttaa sartrelaista jonoa, jossa yksilöt 
jonottavat jotain hyväkettä. Jokainen jonossa olija toivoo edessä ole-
van luovuttavan ja pitää huolen siitä, että kukaan ei kiilaa takaa ohi. 
Tällaista sartrelaista jonoa luovat sekä yhteiskunnalliset rakenteet että 
opitut persoonalliset asenteet.
Tästä näkökulmasta katsottuna oppimisyhteisön luonne on ratkai-
sevan tärkeä. Oppimisyhteisössä yksilöt oppivat perusasenteet merki-
tyksellisiä toisia sekä vieraita kohtaan. Jos oppimisyhteisö toimii tun-
nustuksen positiivisen kehän mukaisesti, se antaa oppijalle hyvät per-
soonalliset dispositiot (habitus) osallistua demokraattisiin käytäntöihin 
ja yhteistoiminnalliseen työhön. Jos kilpailuhenki oppimisyhteisössä 
muistuttaa enemmän tunnustuksen negatiivista kehää, silloin näkymät 
demokraattisiin instituutioihin osallistumiselle ovat huonot.
Kriittisen aikuiskasvatuksen tulisi myös pyrkiä toimimaan oppi-
misyhteisönä, jossa vallitsee tunnustuksen positiivinen kehä ja subjek-
tit tavoittelevat ilman pakotusta yhteistä merkitystä. Jos aikuisopiske-
luryhmä itse toimii epädemokraattisesti ja jollakin tässä ryhmässä on 
enemmän auktoriteettia (opettaja, intellektuelli, akateemisesti koulu-
tettu henkilö ym.) ja enemmän tunnustettu ääni, tämä yhteisö voi sil-
loin pikemminkin vahvistaa olemassa olevaa sosiaalista hierarkiaa kuin 
valtauttaa subjekteja. Jos ideologiakritiikkiä opetetaan asenteella, jossa 
vain opettaja voi todella nähdä ideologian taakse, se on samaa kuin 
opettaa demokratiaa indoktrinoivasti. Tietenkin aikuisopiskelijaryh-
mässä opettaja (jos sellaista on) omaa tiettyä tiedollista auktoriteettia, 
mutta perustaltaan hänen näkemyksensä yhteiskunnasta ja politiikasta 
eivät ole sen oikeampia kuin kenenkään muun. Kriittisessä aikuiskas-
vatuksessa tulisi myös välttää indoktrinaatiota ja seurata kommunika-
tiivisen opettamisen ideaa, jossa opettaja ja oppijat yhdessä osallistu-
vat yhteisen merkityksen luomiseen. Vain tältä perustalta voi kriitti-
nen aikuiskasvatus inspiroida persoonia autenttiseen poliittiseen toi-
mintaan niin tunnustuksen politiikan kuin redistribuution politiikan 
merkityksessä.
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11 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Indoctrination and socialization
A central theme in education and sociology of education is the role of 
educational institutions in the socialization process. In the era of the 
modern industrial society, we tend to understand the role of educa-
tional institutions in the spirit of the Enlightenment. The spirit of the 
Enlightenment includes such ideas as Bildung (including the right to 
education), democracy, habeas corpus (the right to physical and social 
integrity), the welfare sate1, the right to one’s own political and reli-
gious convictions, etc. In pre-modern traditional societies, the func-
tion of education was to reproduce the existing value system and the 
system of social order as such. The principal form of education in tra-
ditional (pre-modern) societies was home education, or upbringing in 
the family environment, and its purpose was solely to socialize the new 
generation into their parents’ values and social occupation. According 
to Emile Durkheim, in this kind of society the so-called mechanical 
solidarity prevails (Durkhe im 1964). 
In every society, some part of a person’s identity is solidified as a 
result of primary socialization, but in traditional societies socialization 
tends to produce “sameness” and “staticness”. In traditional societies, 
education tends to produce closed and static identities with pure tol-
erance of strangeness. In Durkheimian spirit, we can claim that a tra-
ditional society does not give an individual the possibility to creatively 
develop their own personal identity and life plan. In a traditional soci-
ety, due to the low degree of division of labor, social integration takes 
place mainly in the form of mechanical solidarity. It means solidarity 
between those individuals who think alike, act alike, have the same 
value system, speak the same language, etc. Mechanical solidarity is 
intolerant, doctrinaire and prejudiced. In a traditional society, highly 
individual personalities are perceived as a threat, not as a resource or 
potential. A traditional society tends to produce a static form of per-
sonality, which I call a traditional personality. A traditional personality 
1 The role of education in the formation of a welfare state, see example Torres & 
Antikainen 2003.
2is a person who has been socialized under the structures of mechani-
cal solidarity2. 
Mechanical solidarity and the traditional form of personality do 
not solely belong to the past, traditional society. The present, mod-
ern society still carries many features of mechanical solidarity, and its 
institutions (education, army, church, media, etc.) sometimes tend to 
uphold the traditional form of personality. In modern societies, there 
are institutions and social processes which tend to produce mechani-
cal solidarity and there are institutions and social processes which tend 
to produce organic solidarity. I understand the concepts of mechan-
ical and organic solidarity – and the corresponding forms of person-
ality – as ideal types which depict the contradictory nature of mod-
ern society.
There are many features of mechanic solidarity also in the Finn-
ish society, although Finland is a modern society. This concerns the 
Finnish educational system, as well. Both Sakari Suutarinen (2000) 
and Margaret Trotta Tuomi (2001) point out that textbooks in schools 
consistently avoid ethnic descriptions and try to present the Finns as a 
homogeneous people. In tuition, there is an unwillingness to cover eth-
nic and cultural diversity among Finnish-speaking regions, because the 
function of the school is understood as promoting national uniformity 
in the spirit of the Fennomans. According to Tuomi, these empirical 
findings support Bourdiue’s (1990) claim that schools see their func-
tion as one to maintain the status quo (See Tuomi 2001, 23). 
Form the perspective of the modern Western worldview, the edu-
cation in accordance with mechanical solidarity can be described with 
the term indoctrination. The concept of indoctrination in its modern 
critical meaning was invented by William Heard Kilpatrick. Indoctri-
nation can be defined as infiltrating (drilling, inculcating etc.) con-
cepts, attitudes, beliefs, and theories into a pupil’s or student’s mind 
by passing her free and critical deliberation3. According to Kilpatrick, 
in a traditional society this kind of education was more a norm than 
an exception (Kilpatrick 1972, 47–48):
2 See article Reviving the Gadamer-Habermas Debate in the Context of Theory of 
Indoctrination.
3 See article Habermas and the Problem of Indoctrination. 
3The word [indoctrination] means, literally, implanting doctrines. When 
such implanting on an uncritical basis was the common practice of the 
school and indeed one of its principal aims, to indoctrinate and to teach 
came to be [nothing] but diverse ways of describing the same process… 
But with the development of democracy and the coming of modern 
rapid change, it was increasingly felt that education could no longer 
be content with inducing uncritical belief, but must instead develop 
responsible thinking on the part of all as a necessary preparation for 
democratic living and citizenship and an unpredictable future. 
Education and socialization in this traditional – i.e. indoctrinative – 
sense does not aim at an individual and autonomous personality. It 
aims at traditional persons who think, speak, act, believe, etc. alike, 
and fear and dream the same things. In a traditional society, there is 
only one model of good life, and education is based on that model. 
According to Durkheim, in a society of mechanic solidarity there is 
very little room for individual thinking – that is, individual conscious-
ness. Durkheim claims that humans have two consciousnesses. One 
form of consciousness is common for a group or for the whole soci-
ety, and the other form is an individual consciousness which makes 
us individual persons. Durkheim defines the term person in the fol-
lowing way (1961, 51): “To say that one is a person is to say that he 
is distinct from all others.” When mechanical solidarity is at its stron-
gest, the collective consciousness almost entirely covers the individual 
consciousness and there is only minimal distinction between individ-
uals – so minimal that we cannot speak about true persons. I refer to 
the form of personality that is related to mechanical solidarity with 
the term traditional personality. In a traditional society a person’s indi-
viduality is minimal. When mechanical solidarity prevails, the indi-
vidual is more like the collective than a personal being. Traditional 
personality is not personhood at all in the modern sense of the word. 
“Whereas the previous type [mechanical solidarity] implies that indi-
viduals resemble each other, this type [organic solidarity] presumes 
their difference. The first is possible only in so far as the individual 
personality is absorbed into collective personality; the second is pos-
sible only if each has a sphere of action which is peculiar to him; that 
is, a personality” (Durkheim 1964, 131).
In modern societies, identities are open to a certain extent. In a 
modern society, educational institutions leave or at least should leave 
4the identity of an individual open. The individual tends to remain 
somewhat “incomplete“ in a modern society. The modern person is 
conscious of her capacity to change her own identity, and she possesses 
the perspective of many possible identities (Berger, Berger & Kellner 
1973, 73). This relatively open form of identity produces the plural-
isation of life-worlds and meaning perspectives. The pluralisation of 
life-worlds, then, makes possible conducting one’s own life plan. The 
fundamental feature of a modern person is that she conducts her own 
life plan which becomes the primary source of her identity. Conduct-
ing the life plan means conducting one’s own identity, personhood 
and selfhood (Berger, Berger & Kellner 1973, 70–71). Beck, Giddens 
& Lash call this same phenomenon reflexive modernity (Beck, Gid-
dens & Lash 1994). Education is a precondition for reflexive moder-
nity. Without proper education an individual does not gain means for 
designing her own life plan4. 
The pluralization of life-worlds is connected to the pluralization of 
worldviews. At the heart of Habermas’s theory of communicative action 
is the vision that the modern world-view is differentiated into three parts. 
Following Immanuel Kant and Karl Popper, Habermas distinguishes the 
objective world, the social world and the subjective world. A communi-
catively competent speaker can independently present differentiated state-
ments concerning any of these three worlds. She can independently eval-
uate any statement about the world with proper validity claims. There are 
three validity claims for these three worlds:
1) Truth (Wahrheit). A claim that refers to the objective world is 
valid if it is true, i.e. if it corresponds to the reality.
2) Truthfulness (Wahrhaftigkeit). A claim that refers to the subjec-
tive world is valid if it is honest, i.e. if it has an authentic rela-
tionship with the subjective world.
3) Rightness (Richtigkeit). A claim that refers to the social world 
is valid if it does not contradict commonly agreed social norms 
(Habermas 1984, 440). 
4 One way to study life plans and identity formation is the biographical method. 
See Huttunen, Heikkinen & Syrjälä 2002 on biographical research in education. See 
Antikainen & Komonen 2003 on biographical research in sociology of education.
5Habermas claims that expansion and deepening of action-orientated 
understanding (contra to orientation to exploitation, utilization, and 
manipulation) is not possible without pluralization of worldviews, sec-
ularization of worldviews and the genesis of communicatively compe-
tent speaker. Only this way the actor and the speaker can have a crit-
ically reflective relation to tradition and the interpretations that are 
embodied in tradition5. I define the ideal type of the modern person-
ality likewise. She is a kind of person who is capable of forming a crit-
ically reflective relation to tradition and can to a certain extent criti-
cally evaluate interpretations that the tradition consists of. The basic 
claim in the critical theory of sociology of education is that indoctrina-
tive education prevents the formation of the modern person and thus 
also prevents social criticism and critique of ideology. 
According to Hans-Georg Gadamer, a critically reflective relation 
to tradition is impossible because we are products of tradition. Every-
thing that we do or think stays within the tradition. There is no break 
or escape from tradition even in the case of social revolution, through 
which the all existing social institutions are replaced with new ones. 
For Gadamer, Bildung is socialization into tradition and its values. 
Gadamer thinks that we must first understand the tradition and open 
up to the tradition before we can evaluate and renew it. Habermas 
wants to us have a critical and reflective attitude to begin with and 
demands us to trust our own power of judgment. In the Habermasian 
model of critical learning6, the Enlightened Cartesian and Kantian 
autonomic subject postpones prejudices and authority until she has 
decided which part of the tradition is worth saving. 
Of course, the problem here is: Where does this Kantian auto-
nomic subject come from if not from the process of education itself? 
How can a student or a pupil exercise her Kantian autonomy towards 
tradition in the process of education, if Kantian autonomy is an out-
come of education? This situation is called the pedagogical paradox (see 
Uljens 2001). 
Gadamer and Durkheim avoid the pedagogical paradox by iden-
tifying education with socialization. Education is the process through 
5 See article Reviving the Gadamer-Habermas Debate in the Context of Theory of 
Indoctrination.
6 On the critical Bildung Theory, see Sünker 2006, 13-23.
6which an individual adopts the content of a tradition and becomes a 
mature member of a community. An individual must first grow into 
a tradition before she can evaluate the content of the tradition. Dur-
kheim’s view is more or less the same, though he lays more emphasis on 
the socially functionalistic role of educational institutions. Durkheim 
defines education in the following way (Durkheim 1956, 71):
Education is the influence exercised by adult generations on those that 
are not yet ready for social life. Its object is to arouse and to develop 
in the child a certain number of physical, intellectual and moral states 
which are demanded of him by both the political society as a whole and 
the special milieu for which he is specifically destined.
According to Paul Fauconnet’s interpretation of Durkheim, auton-
omy is the attitude of a will that accepts rules because the will recog-
nizes their rational ground. First a child receives rules from society. The 
child is not able to evaluate which rules are valid and which need to 
be either rejected or renewed. Only autonomic attitude is capable of 
this evaluation, and autonomy grows gradually in the process of edu-
cation (Fauconnet in Durkheim 1956, 45). Habermas, on the other 
hand, claims that evaluation of rules and norms, which happens after-
wards, is bound to tradition. Habermas claims that if the only basis 
for validity of norms is tradition (like legal positivism states), then no 
one possesses true autonomy. Nevertheless, the Habermasian model of 
education cannot escape the pedagogical paradox. Where does auton-
omy come from if young pupils are not communicatively competent to 
critically evaluate the content of tradition? If critical learning requires 
critical evaluation and reflection of the tradition, a communicatively 
incompetent learner is unable to learn critically. Through what kind 
of learning process is a critical and communicatively competent sub-
ject formed? Asking this question is the same as asking how Bildung is 
possible, because Bildung means formation of a mature (Mündigkeit) 
subjectivity. For this purpose, I have constructed a model of commu-
nicative teaching which tries to preserve the idea of critical learning 
while recognizing the authority of the teacher and tradition7.
7 This is also the basic intention of the pedagogy of Paolo Freire. For example Ray-
mond Allen Morrow and Alberto Carlos Torres (2002) have written on convergence 
between Freire and Habermas. 
7The idea of communicative teaching requires the so-called univer-
sal presuppositions of argumentation (Habermas 1990, 88–89):
(2.1) Every speaker may assert only what he really believes.
(2.2) A person who disputes a proposition or norm under discus-
sion must provide a reason for wanting to do so.
(3.1) Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed 
to take part in a discourse.
(3.2) A) Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever. 
B) Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever 
into the discourse. C) Everyone is allowed to express his atti-
tudes, desires and needs.
(3.3) No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coer-
cion, from exercising his rights as laid down in (3.1) and 
(3.2).
Sheila Benhabib has condensed these presuppositions by saying that 
valid consensus can only be achieved by communication that is sym-
metrical, reciprocal and reflective (Benhabib 1986, 285).
In the article Habermas and the Problem of Indoctrination, I define 
communicative teaching as including the value orientations by which 
the teacher commits herself to the “universal” presuppositions of argu-
mentation and acts in accordance with these maxims as to the best of 
her ability (Huttunen 2003). The phrase “as to the best of her ability” 
is needed because the pedagogical relationship can never be “symmet-
rical”. The best a teacher can do is to act as if the pupils were com-
municatively competent speakers. Of course, the pupils aren’t fully 
communicatively competent speakers, and that is why communicative 
teaching can never be the same as communicative action in the Hab-
ermasian sense. Nevertheless, a teacher must make an effort to orien-
tate her actions towards communicative action and not towards stra-
tegic action. I claim – following Jaan Masschelein (1991, 42) – that 
pedagogical communication is a kind of simulated communicative 
action and it is more simulated in the early stage of education. When 
a teacher teaches seven year old pupils, the words “to the best of her 
ability” have different practical consequence than in the case of a uni-
versity teacher teaching twenty year old students. The value orienta-
tion is the same, but the practise or application of presuppositions 
of argumentation is different. When we understand communicative 
8teaching in this way, as an exceptional form of communicative action, 
the concept of communicative teaching is looser than the concept of 
communicative action itself. I would like to think that communica-
tive teaching – as an exceptional application of communicative action 
– still remains within the realm of communicative action, although 
teachers sometimes use language in a strategic way – that is, in a way 
that is not fully transparent to the pupils8. 
Using the concept of communicative teaching, I reconstruct the 
so-called communicative criterion of indoctrination. I agree with Wil-
liam Kilpatrick’s claim that the most important element in non-indoc-
trinative teaching is respect for other persons. Respect for other per-
sons is also the essence of Habermas’s concept communicative action. 
In a Habermasian manner, I define strategic teaching as the kind of 
teaching in which the teacher treats her students solely as objects, as 
objects of series of didactical maneuvers. This kind of teaching is typ-
ical to a traditional society, and it tends to produce traditional person-
alities. In a modern society, strategic teaching is a form of indoctrina-
tion (although strategic teaching is not the same as indoctrination), 
through which the teacher tries to transfer the content of tuition to 
the students’ or pupils’ minds, treating them merely as passive objects, 
not as active co-subjects of the learning process. In this caser, teach-
ing is in no sense simulation of communicative action but pure stra-
tegic action. 
Communicative teaching is contradictory to strategic teaching. Its aim 
is to bring about a communicatively competent speaker who does not need 
to rely on the teacher, or any other authority for that matter. In communi-
cative teaching, students and pupils are not treated as passive objects but as 
active learners. In communicative teaching, the teacher and her students 
co-operatively participate in the formation of meanings and new perspec-
tives. In communicative teaching, the teacher does not impose her ideas 
on the students, but rather they make a joint effort to find a meaningful 
insight regarding the issues at hand. Communicative teaching is as close 
as possible to the ideal of communicative action that it can get in a real 
teaching situation. Communicative teaching is a simulation of commu-
8 Pentti Moilanen (1998) makes a bold statement by demanding that at least in 
teacher education a lecturer’s all pedagogical acts must be fully transparent to the stu-
dents. Moilanen claims that a lecturer is allowed to – or has no choice but to – use 
strategic action in teaching, but the strategic action must be open.
9nicative action, a simulation of a free and equal discourse. It is also a sim-
ulation of democracy and democratic mode of action. This means that 
communicative teaching can not take place in a school if the school does 
not work in a democratic way. Every attempt to avoid indoctrination in 
schools will remain insufficient unless no effort is made to practice democ-
racy in action. 
My unique contribution to the theory of indoctrination is to bring 
the aspect of sociology (social theory) and critical theory into the dis-
cussion. The discussion concerning the theory of indoctrination is 
even today limited by analytical philosophy to the (unsocial) concept 
of action and to methodological individualism. On the other hand, I 
want to contribute to sociology of education by bringing the aspect of 
the indoctrination into it. Sociology of education does not properly 
recognize the concept of indoctrination which is an important social 
aspect of education. Sociology of education deals with the same kind 
of problem under the headings of ideology, hidden curriculum, power 
in education, symbolic control in education, codes in pedagogic dis-
course, knowledge structures in education, authoritarianism in educa-
tion, reproduction of cultural and socio-economical classes in educa-
tion, biopower in schools, racial and gender discrimination in schools, 
political economy of educational symbols, etc. 
Regardless of the fact that the theory of indoctrination and soci-
ology of education sometimes come very close to each other, so far 
there is no proper sociological theory of indoctrination. For example, 
in the anthology Towards Sociology of Education edited by John Beck et 
al., the term indoctrination is mentioned once in the context of “nat-
ural training of social character” by Raymond Williams, who is not 
a scholar of sociology of education (Williams 1978, 390). Neverthe-
less, Raymond Williams is right. When we speak of social character 
and its formation, we should take into account the aspect of indoctri-
nation. Also Ivan Illich uses the term indoctrination once in his book 
Deschooling Society (Illich 1971), but he refers to a different phenom-
enon. Likewise, Michael W. Apple (1980, 28) mentions the term once 
in his book Ideology and Curriculum, in the context of the progressive 
educational movement in the United States and progressive educa-
tors’ discussion on the question whether school curriculums should be 
guided by a vision of a more just society (see Kilpatrick 1972, 49–50; 
54). Possibly closest to the theory of indoctrination come Basil Bern-
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stein and Peter McLaren. Bernstein’s (1990) study The Structuring of 
Pedagogic Discourse: vol. IV Class, Codes and Control – and its previous 
volumes – covers many aspects of indoctrinative education from the 
point of view of reproduction of the cultural class. McLaren’s study 
Schooling as a Ritual performance: Towards a Political Economy of Edu-
cational Symbols & Gestures contains a whole chapter devoted to reli-
gious indoctrination, although McLaren does not use the term indoc-
trination (McLaren 1993, 180–216).
Nevertheless, I claim that none of these concepts which have been 
used in sociology of education to study phenomena similar to indoc-
trination do cover all the aspects that the concept of indoctrination 
brings about. For example, we can imagine a teaching situation in 
which ideological distortion and authoritarian compulsion is mini-
mal but teaching still is highly indoctrinative. This is the case in a sit-
uation in which a teacher excludes all uncomfortable issues (sexuality, 
moral conflicts, politically sensitive issues etc.) from her tuition. The 
goal of unindoctrinative education is to improve pupils’ and students’ 
own power of judgment especially concerning ethically and politi-
cally sensitive issues. The case in which the teacher or the curriculum 
(intentionally or unintentionally) excludes all uncomfortable teaching 
content is a form of indoctrination which leaves the students’ power 
of judgment in an immature state (example Puolimatka 1996, 155). 
When education systematically leaves pupils or students in an imma-
ture state, it is indoctrination par excellence. This is an important social 
aspect of education, and sociology of education cannot grasp it with-
out the concept of indoctrination.  
In the article Habermas and the Problem of Indoctrination, I propose 
new criteria for indoctrination greatly inspired by Habermas’s com-
municative theory of action and the idea of reflective modernity. One 
might ask what practical significance these criteria have, for example, 
for contemporary education in Finland. I have presented these crite-
ria in the interest of improving curriculums and educational practices. 
In the Finnish context, the so-called traditional (common) theory of 
indoctrination is quite useless. The traditional theory connects indoc-
trination with the authoritarian teaching method (method criterion), 
doctrinal teaching content (content criterion), the teacher’s indoctri-
native intention (intention criterion), and the notion of the indoctri-
nated (consequence criterion). In the Finnish and the Nordic contexts, 
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teaching methods are rarely authoritarian, the content of tuition does 
not contain pure religious or political doctrines (except religious classes 
in schools), professional teachers hardly intentionally indoctrinate any-
one, and it is quite unfair to say that public educational institutions in 
Scandinavia systematically produce indoctrinated persons. Despite of 
this, I do not mean to say that indoctrinative processes do not happen 
in a modern teaching situation even in the Nordic context. 
The danger of indoctrination is present in modern societies, but 
the traditional theory of indoctrination does not recognize it. We 
must become sensitive for new forms of indoctrination. In the mod-
ern teaching situation, many unreflected prejudices – concerning sex-
ual orientation, cultural background, gender issues, nationality, etc. – 
are still passed on to the next generation. We still need the theory of 
indoctrination when we plan curriculums and develop teacher educa-
tion, but the traditional theory of indoctrination does not suffice. We 
need a (reflexively) modern theory of indoctrination, and it is precisely 
my intention to present ideas for such a theory.
1.2 Learning democracy and valid action norms in 
schools
Unindoctrinative teaching and democracy are inherently intercon-
nected. Avoiding indoctrination is a precondition for the formation 
of a modern person and of democracy as a personal virtue. It is also 
true that one cannot learn a democratic attitude and democratic dis-
cussion culture just by memorization and cramming. One cannot learn 
to be democratic by indoctrination. A report by UNESCO describes 
the relation between indoctrination and democracy in a similar man-
ner (Delors et al. 1998, 50): “The aim is not to teach moral principles 
as rigid rules, in an indoctrination-like way, but to introduce demo-
cratic practices into the school.” 
My idea of communicative teaching serves as a kind of simula-
tion of a democratic discussion inside the classroom. In communica-
tive teaching, the both teacher and the pupils make an effort to find a 
common meaning. Of course, the teacher has the leading role in ped-
agogical communication, and that is why a communicative pedagog-
ical relationship still is only a simulation of proper communicative 
action and democratic dialogue. Nevertheless, communicative teach-
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ing is a way to learn democratic discussion procedures. The teacher 
cannot teach democracy if she practices the so-called strategic teach-
ing and treats pupils as if they were natural objects which the teacher 
just manipulates. This is the reason why it is very difficult to import 
democratic procedures into a country in which educational institu-
tions aim at indoctrination. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to learn a democratic attitude, a trust 
in democracy, and a democratic discussion culture just by simulation. 
At its best, communicative teaching is a simulation of democratic dia-
logue (i.e. communicative action), but a simulation cannot serve as 
a substitute for the real thing. It does not matter how well a simu-
lation of democratic dialogue is executed inside the classroom if the 
school itself and the educational policy on the national level work in 
an authoritarian and undemocratic manner. One cannot learn democ-
racy in an undemocratic social context. If a discussion situation in the 
classroom is held in democratic spirit but the school is administrated 
in an undemocratic manner, there will be no successful socialization of 
democratic procedures. The situation might create a caricature image 
of democracy into the pupils’ minds. This is certainly not the way to 
foster a democratic attitude and a modern person. Instead, it could 
be a hidden curriculum of pseudo democracy. Communicative teach-
ing aims at the idea of radical democracy which differs from the idea 
of democracy of political liberalism. According to Axel Honneth, the 
essence of the liberalist concept of democracy includes “limiting the 
participatory activity of citizen to the function of periodically legiti-
mating the state’s exercise of power” (Honneth 2007, 218). Honneth 
claims that we can find from John Dewey’s mature work The Public 
and Its Problems (Dewey 1991) a more radical and richer concept of 
democracy than the current hegemonic notion of democracy of polit-
ical liberalism. 
What could then be a democratic way to create action norms in 
schools which at the same time could serve as the didactic of partic-
ipatory democracy? In the article Between Facts and Norms – Action 
Research in the Light of Jürgen Habermas’s Theory of Communicative 
Action and Discourse Theory of Justice, Huttunen & Heikkinen (1998) 
apply Habermas’s discourse theory of justice into democratic school 
management in order to find valid action norms. In his book Between 
Facts and Norms, Habermas develops the so-called process model of 
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ideal rational will-formation (Habermas 1996, 168). This model can 
be applied into school management. Habermas’s discourse theory of 
justice and model of ideal rational will-formation relies on the uni-
versal presuppositions of argumentation. From these presuppositions, 
Habermas deduces the so-called universality principle U and discourse 
principle D (Habermas 1996, 65–66):
U: Norm is valid if all affected can accept the consequences and 
side effects its general observance can be anticipated to have for 
the satisfaction of everyone’s interests.
D: Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could 
meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as partic-
ipants in a practical discourse.
In a school “all affected in” includes, for example, the teachers, the 
parents and the pupils. It is clear, at least in the Nordic countries, that 
the teachers and the parents should have the possibility to participate 
in school management. How about the pupils? Habermas’s discourse 
principle implies that pupils should also have the possibility to partic-
ipate in the practical discourse insofar as their capacity to communi-
cative action (the level of communicative competence) allows it. Of 
course, there will be great difficulties organizing a practical discourse 
in the Habermasian sense in a school. Seven year old pupils’ commu-
nicative competency for practical discourse is almost nonexistent. On 
the other hand, fifteen year old pupils have greater communicative 
skills than generally is expected. 
The Habermasian model of ideal rational will-formation does not 
tell us how pupils should be given the possibility to participate in school 
democracy. but it gives us the general idea how a democratic practical dis-
course should be organized so that all affected can participate in the dem-
ocratic process in its different phases. Huttunen & Heikkinen apply the 
Habermasian model into school management in the following way:
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Figure 1. The process model of rational collective will-formation in devel-
oping action norms for school management (Heikkinen & Huttunen 1998) 
The first question in a practical discourse on the level of a single school 
is “What should be done in schools?”. The level of practical discourse 
on which this basic question can be presented is the so-called pragmat-
ical discourse. It might happen that consensus on the concrete action 
norms is achieved in this general practical discourse, but in many 
cases the question concerning the concrete action norm in school life 
is either related to deeper values or to interests of different interests 
PROCEDURALLY
REGULATED BARGAINING
- combining the different interests
through procedurally regulated
strategic action -
• “How can we take interests of
different interest groups into account
(teachers, parents, etc.)?”
PRAGMATICAL DISCOURSES
- discussion of the practices in the school -
• “What should be done in the school?”
ETHICAL-POLITICAL 
DISCOURSES
- establishing the values 
through communicative action -
• “What are the values on which the
practices in the school is based on?”
MORAL DISCOURSES
- considering the action norms in the light of generaliz-
eralizeable interests -
• “Can all the parties concerned accept
the final outcome as their own interests?”
LEGAL DISCOURSES
- the compatibility of action norms -
• “How integrated a whole is the combination of all the
factual action norms; including all the factual laws,
statutes, statutory regulations, directives
and the curricula of other schools?”
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groups (teacher, parents, and pupils). If the problem is related to inter-
ests groups, a new discourse called procedurally regulated bargaining 
should be opened. If the problem is related to the school’s values, a new 
discourse called ethical-political discourse should be opened. Sometimes 
it could be difficult to differentiate which questions are value questions 
and which are related to material interests. The outcome (a common 
proposal for a new action norm) of pragmatic and ethical political dis-
courses and procedurally regulated bargaining should then be subor-
dinated to a moral discourse in which the matter is treated according 
to universal interests. If consensus is achieved in the moral discourse, 
the results are submitted to legal discourses in which the consistency 
of the law is verified. A legal discourse is not necessary for every con-
crete action norm in a school.
Like I mentioned earlier, Habermas’s discourse theory of justice does 
not provide a solution to the question of how pupils should take part this 
practical discourse on the level of a single school. Nevertheless, we can say 
for sure that if such possibility does not exist in a school at all, no valid 
action norms can be created in the Habermasian sense. The same con-
clusion can be drawn from Theodor Adorno’s (1998) and Heinz Sünker’s 
(2006, 105–116) idea of a “democratic Bildung theory”.
What can be done in Finnish schools to improve pupils’ oppor-
tunities to participate in democratic processes and to learn this way 
democracy in action? A project called “Nuorten Ääni” (The Voice of 
Young) in Helsinki shows us very interesting prospects9. The project 
is run by the city of Helsinki, and it is a part of democracy education. 
The basic idea is to develop and improve the youth’s partnership in 
social interaction. The project includes many different kinds of activ-
ity, but the most important form of participation is that the young 
can vote on the funding for things and improvements in the school 
that they feel are important and needed. Starting from the year 2008, 
“Nuorten Ääni” has been a part of the basic operations of the city of 
Helsinki. In 2008, 142 schools were participating in the project. Every 
year, the pupils in those schools consider which things, projects or rep-
arations (of the school building) most crucially need funding. In this 
9 See the project’s webside at: <http://www.hel.fi/wps/portal/Nuorisoasiaink-
eskus/Artikkeli?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/Nk/fi/Osallistu+ja+vaikuta/Hesan+ 
Nuorten+__ni>
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way, the city of Helsinki tries to socialize the young into democratic 
procedures by allowing them to participate in democratic delibera-
tion on real issues10. This is only one but a very promising attempt to 
really teach democracy.
1.3 Democracy and recognition in education
The formation of a modern and democratic mode of personality is also 
connected to the reciprocal process of recognition11. Both Friedrich 
Hegel and Georg Herbert Mead considered the process of recognition 
as a genesis of personal identity. Hegel’s phrase “reconciled with others” 
means that only by receiving recognition from others a person achieves 
her own identity. A person cannot learn to know her special charac-
teristic without a relation with others. George Herbert Mead learned 
this Hegelian concept of identity formation – which is at the same 
time the development of Spirit (see Williams 1992, 73–94) – from 
Wilhelm Dilthey, whose lectures he attended while studying in Ger-
many (See Miller 1988). Later Mead created a sociological theory on 
identity by redefining the terms I, Me and Myself (Mead 1983). These 
concepts correspond Hegel’s three phases of spirit: spirit in-itself, for-
itself and in-and-for-itself. 
Following Hegel and Mead, Axel Honneth claims that to achieve a 
productive relationship with themselves, humans require intersubjec-
tive recognition of their abilities and achievements. If this social rec-
ognition fails to happen, it might cause a psychological gap within the 
personality which is expressed as a reaction of shame, anger or con-
tempt (Honneth 1995, 257). From the reciprocal relation of recog-
nition grows a person’s moral consciousness. According to Honneth’s 
interpretation of Hegel, morality is developed on the grounds of the 
negative and positive feedback a person receives in the struggle (strive) 
for recognition. The person’s level of morality depends on the level of 
recognition received. In Honneth’s theory, there are three levels of the 
10 I would like to acknowledge researcher Anja Karhunen for giving me inside 
information on the project “Nuorten Ääni”.
11 See articles Teaching and the Dialectic of Recognition by Huttunen & Heikki-
nen and Critical Adult Education and the Political-Philosophical Debate between Nancy 
Fracer and Axel Honneth by Huttunen. 
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struggle for recognition, which correspond to the Hegelian terminol-
ogy of family, civil society and State:
dimension of
personality
needs and 
emotions
moral 
responsibility
traits and abilities
forms of 
recognition
primary 
relationships 
(family)
-
love, friendship
legal relations
(civil society)
-
rights
community of 
value
(state)
-
solidarity 
practical
relation-to-self
 
self-confidence self-respect self-esteem
forms of 
disrespect
abuse and
rape
denial of rights, 
exclusion
denigration,
insult
threatened 
component of 
personality
physical
integrity
social 
integrity
honour
dignity
Figure 2. The structure of intersubjective relations of recognition (modi-
fied from Honneth 1994, 211; and 1996, 129)
These three levels of the struggle for recognition correspond to three 
forms of self-relation: 1) self-confidence (Selbstvertrauen), 2) self-
respect (Selbstachtung), and 3) self-esteem (Selbstschätzung). Huttunen 
& Heikkinen interpret the Hegelian State as the social institution with 
which one feels solidarity, for which one is ready to “give one’s best” 
and to the values of which one commits oneself12. Thus, the concept 
of State in this context refers to a unit smaller, greater or of the same 
size as an actual political state. Huttunen & Heikkinen interpret the 
Hegelian concept of civil society as community of rights which could 
refer, for example, to an actual political state or even a criminal league. 
It is the social institution which gives or rejects the recognition of a 
full par or a full membership.
In Honneth’s theory, an individual’s self-confidence is established 
and reproduced in reciprocal relations of friendship and love. If an 
individual achieves the experience of being loved, she gains a dispo-
sition to love oneself and to love other individuals. The experience of 
12 See article Teaching and the Dialectic of Recognition.
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being loved and cared for is a basic precondition for an individual’s 
identity and morality. After a successful struggle at this level, an indi-
vidual is ready to strive for higher forms of morality and self-relation 
(Honneth 1995, 252–256).
At the second level of the struggle for recognition, an individual 
gains or does not gain legal rights of an adult person – or in the case 
of deviant socialization, a full membership in a criminal organization. 
When an individual is recognized at this level, she is accepted as an 
autonomous person who has both a right and competence to partici-
pate in the practical discourse of the institution concerned (state, cor-
porative organization, criminal league, etc.). In the institution con-
cerned, she is considered as a person who has freedom of will and is 
responsible for her actions. Kant and Durkheim considered this auton-
omous person as the goal of education. The self-relation that one gains 
from the experience that she is treated as a mature adult person is self-
respect. If an individual never achieves this kind of experience, she can-
not function as an autonomous person. 
Hegel claims that recognition as an autonomous person is not the 
highest form of recognition. Individual personhood, freedom and 
autonomy are granted, but still the individuality of the individual 
remains abstract and untrue. Individuality in this level is merely a con-
cept (Hegel 1983, 120–123). The person’s autonomy remains abstract 
until she has the opportunity to perform her freedom and autonomy 
through work. The issue at the third level of recognition is how the 
community values a person’s contribution. If the individual is rec-
ognized as a person whose contribution to the community (State) is 
important, then the person gets the experience that she is needed and 
her work is appreciated. From this experience grows the practical self-
relation called self-esteem. In an ideal situation, self-esteemed per-
sons reciprocally recognize each others contribution to the commu-
nity. From this kind of reciprocal relation of recognition grows soli-
darity and loyalty (Honneth 2007, 139).
The formation of a democratic attitude requires these three forms 
of self-relation. In a democratic society we need caring, and only indi-
viduals who possess a good self-confidence (capacity to love others and 
oneself ) can care. A democratic society requires reciprocal recognition 
of legal rights, and only a person who possesses a good self-respect 
(capacity to know one’s own rights) can recognize the rights of the oth-
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ers. And finally, a democratic society requires reciprocal recognition 
of work (work being paid for, housework, voluntary work, charitable 
work, animal protection work, and other kinds of autonomous con-
tribution to the community), and only a person who possesses a good 
self-esteem can recognize the contribution of the others. The forma-
tion of self-confidence and self-respect are very much matters of edu-
cation, the former being a matter of family upbringing and the latter 
of school education. The formation of self-esteem is only partly a mat-
ter of adult education. Mainly it is a matter of normal (in the case of a 
democratic society) social interaction between adult persons. 
The thing which Huttunen & Heikkinen call the positive circle 
of recognition13 is the ideal case of reciprocal relation of recognition. 
In the positive circle of recognition, trust, loyalty and spirit are con-
structed through a reciprocal relation of recognition. Everybody works 
for the common good, because they have achieved the experience that 
their contribution is needed and important. When somebody in the 
community gains success and receives recognition, others also take 
pleasure in it, because somebody else’s success and recognition is not 
“off from me” but quite contrary. The success of one creates possibili-
ties for the others in the community, and one’s success is related to pre-
vious successful contributions of other members of the community. A 
positive circle of recognition creates a strong feeling of solidarity which 
on the level of the state makes participatory democracy and active cit-
izenship both possible and desired14. In a true democracy, everybody’s 
contribution is valued and even desired. 
Unfortunately, a negative and destructive circle of recognition usu-
ally prevails on the global, national and local levels. The situation in 
a negative circle of recognition resembles a Sartrean queue in which 
individuals are waiting on a line for some goods. Everybody in the 
queue hopes that the next person will drop out, and everybody takes 
care that the person behind her will not overhaul. This kind of a Sar-
trean queue is created both by social structures and learned personal 
13 How the Huttunen & Heikkinen model has been applied in exceptional teach-
ers’ award system in USA and Canada, see Andrews 2006, 14–15.  
14 The positive circle of recognition in a teaching situation corresponds to the sit-
uation which Tuomi calls human dignity in the learning environment. It requires, 
among other things, a diversity-positive milieu in schools, common trusteeship, just 
treatment and truth seeking without prejudices (Tuomi 2001, 172–178).    
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attitudes. Undemocratic social structures and undemocratic personal 
attitudes create a negative circle of recognition in which everybody is 
either in the situation of the Sartrean queue or, in the worst case, at 
open war. Individuals struggle for recognition in a situation in which 
the other person is a rival or even an enemy. In this kind of social con-
text, no true democracy is possible. 
In this respect, the nature of the learning community in which indi-
viduals learn basic attitudes towards meaningful others and towards 
strangers15 is very crucial. If the learning community itself works in 
line with the positive circle of recognition, it gives the learner a good 
personal disposition (habitus) for participating in democratic proce-
dures and cooperative work. If the competitive spirit of the learning 
community resembles more a negative circle of recognition, then the 
prospects for participating in democratic institutions, and the future 
of democratic institutions itself, are in a bad shape. What if both the 
democratic attitudes of the members of the society and the demo-
cratic social institutions are either underdeveloped or degenerated? In 
this kind of situation, great challenges are presented to adult educa-
tion which should make an effort for an emergence of the democratic 
personal attitude and the hope of a better tomorrow. Fortunately, the 
situation in most countries in Europe and North America is not that 
bad, but still there is a clear need for critical adult education. The task 
of critical adult education in the context of Europe and North Amer-
ica is to contribute to the politics of recognition and the politics of 
redistribution for the repressed social groups. 
Critical adult education should itself work like a learning commu-
nity in which the positive circle of recognition prevails and subjects 
aim at unforced common meanings. If a community of adult educa-
tion (study group) itself works in an undemocratic way and if some-
one in that community (for example a teacher, an intellectual, an aca-
demically educated person, etc.) holds more authority and a more 
recognized voice than others, then the community just reinforces a 
social hierarchy instead of empowering itself (see Ranciére 1995, 54). 
For Jacques Rancière, this kind of a community is no start at all for 
political possibilities and transformative social action. Cathrine Ryther 
15 On pedagogical love and pedagogical friendship, see Kakkori & Huttunen 
2007.
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interprets Rancière in the following way (Ryther 2008; see Ranciere 
1991, 7–8):
Ideology critique is no place to start because it requires the setting up of 
a hierarchy between those who ‘see’ the world as it really is, and those 
who must be made to see. Those who see the hidden curriculum, who 
charge themselves with giving that sight to others, are placed in a posi-
tion of expertise that the ‘others’ can never reach, because in the pro-
cess of explaining the way things really are what the teacher succeeds in 
explaining is that others will not understand unless explained to. 
To teach critique of ideology with the attitude that only a teacher can 
really see behind the ideology means the same thing as trying to indoc-
trinate democracy. Of course, in an adult education group – if there is a 
teacher – the teacher holds some epistemological authority, but funda-
mentally his or her view of society and politics is not more correct that 
anyone else’s. Also, in critical adult education we should avoid indoc-
trination and follow the idea of a communicative teaching in which 
the teacher and the learners together participate in the creation of a 
common meaning. Only on this foundation, critical adult education 
can inspire persons for authentic political action both in the sense of 
politics of recognition and politics of redistribution. 
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2 HABERmAS AND THE PROBLEm OF 
INDOCTRINATION
2.1 The problem of the criteria of indoctrination
In the philosophy of education, the concept of indoctrination refers 
to unethical influencing in a teaching situation. Indoctrination means 
infiltrating (drilling, inculcating etc.) concepts, attitudes, beliefs and 
theories into a student’s mind by passing her free and critical deliber-
ation. When  on a general level  we define indoctrination in this way, 
it is easy to say that the indoctrinative teaching is morally wrong and 
that teachers or educational institutions should not practise it. The 
problem is how do we acknowledge indoctrinative teaching? By what 
criterion do we consider teaching to be a form of indoctrination or to 
have elements of indoctrination? 
The educational philosopher Ivan Snook has divided criteria that have 
been used in educational literature into four classes (Snook 1972, 1667): 
(i) The method of teaching as a criterion of indoctrination. In the 
U.S. context, thanks to John Dewey, the tendency is to connect 
indoctrination to a certain teaching method. This illegitimate 
teaching method is said to include the following elements: a) 
Teaching is authoritarian, b) Teaching content is drilled in stu-
dents’ minds, c) There are threading elements in teaching and 
free discussion is not allowed. Some writers label these as “irra-
tional teaching methods”. 
(ii) The content of teaching as criterion of indoctrination. According 
to the trivial content criterion, the content of teaching determines 
whether or not teaching is indoctrination. As Anthony Flew put it: 
“No doctrines, no indoctrination” (Flew 1972, 11). 
(iii) The intention of teaching as criterion of indoctrination. The 
first person to use the term indoctrination in its pejorative sense 
was William Heard Kilpatrick (see Gatchel 1972, 13). Kilpat-
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rick emphasized the intention of the teacher in his concept of 
indoctrination. He did not deny the possibility of unintentional 
indoctrination, but nevertheless considered the teacher’s inten-
tion to be the most important criterion of indoctrination. John 
White defines a teacher’s so called indoctrinative intention in 
the following way: “The child should believe that ‘p’ is true, in 
a such way that nothing will shake this belief ” (White 1972a, 
119 and 1973, 179). 
(iv) The consequence of teaching as a criterion of indoctrination. 
When we consider indoctrination in the light of the conse-
quence criterion, we focus our attention to the outcomes of 
teaching and education. According to this criterion, teaching 
is indoctrination if the outcome is an “indoctrinated person”. 
John Wilson claims that an indoctrinated person lives in self-
deception. She is a kind of sleepwalker (Wilson 1972, 18). The 
ground of the beliefs of such a person are believed to be unten-
able, or beyond rational reasoning. An indoctrinated person 
holds her conviction despite of the counter evidence. 
These four criteria  stated in this traditional way  include serious problems 
that could potentially render the entire concept of indoctrination useless in 
the context of a post-modern teaching situation. I agree with Snook, who 
claims that indoctrination cannot be defined by certain irrational teach-
ing methods (Snook 1972, 2223). It is clear that when a teacher teaches 
in an authoritarian style, she tends to produce nondiscursive and indoctri-
native learning, although this is a very ineffective way to indoctrinate in a 
modern teaching situation. It is mainly used in the military, in some pri-
vate educational institutes, some workplaces and in other so-called “total 
institutions“ (see Peshkin 1986). However, the lack of this kind of teach-
ing does not necessarily remove the danger of indoctrination, which is 
why I disagree with John Wilson, who insists “it is also logically necessary 
to the concept of indoctrination that the indoctrinated person arrives at 
the belief by nonrational methods” (Wilson 1972, 19). The point in the 
concept of indoctrination is not, nor should it be, the concrete teaching 
method. The same concrete teaching method (for example, questionan-
swercircle) can be used either for indoctrinative purposes, or for legitimate 
educative purposes. But I do not want to reject the aspect of method in 
the theory of indoctrination. 
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One might think that problems of method criterion can be over-
come by the use of content criterion. According to the content cri-
terion, teaching is indoctrination when the content of teaching con-
sists of “unscientific doctrines,” regardless of teaching methods. This 
sounds promising, but the problem is how to define the term doc-
trine. What is the difference between a doctrine and scientific knowl-
edge, quasi-science and true science? Philosophers of science have not 
reached agreement on this subject, but teachers are expected to be able 
to discern between a doctrine and an irrational belief. Members of 
the Vienna Circle claimed that the science is a system of true or justi-
fied beliefs (justificationism; in the context of indoctrination, see for 
example, White 1973). On this matter, I agree with Imre Lakatos, who 
has written that after the non-Euclidean geometry, non-Newtonian 
physics and inductive logic “it turned out that all theories are equally 
unprovable” (Lakatos 1974, 9495). There were good reasons to aban-
don the scientific justificationism. 
Also Karl Popper has clearly demonstrated the incompetence of jus-
tificationism. He has created so called criterion of falsification to be used 
as a demarcation between science and quasi-science. In educational liter-
ature, I. Gregory & R.Woods and Tasos Kazepides have revised the con-
tent criterion in accordance with Popperian falsificationism. Gregory and 
Woods claim that unscientific doctrines are such kinds of statements that 
we can never know are they true or untrue (example political or religious 
conviction). No new findings or conditions can make a doctrine false. 
Gregory and Woods call this the “not-known-to-be-true-or-false” prop-
erty of doctrines. In the case of scientific knowledge, there must be some 
condition when the statement will be falsified. According to Gregory and 
Woods, Karl Marx’s political economy was not a doctrinal system in the 
beginning; afterwards Marxism became a quasiscientific and nonfalsifica-
tive doctrinal system (Gregory & Woods 1972). 
This Popperian revision of the content criterion also has serious 
problems. Every scientific theory has some elements that are nonfal-
sificative. Let us take the Euclidean geometry as an example. From the 
point of view of falsificationism, one can say that the Euclidian geom-
etry is a doctrinal system, because there is no condition in which it 
could be falsified. But it would be ridiculous to say that the teaching 
of the Euclidian geometry represents a form of indoctrination, because 
it does not include any criterion of falsification. 
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I am strong agreement with John White, who claims that indoctri-
nated beliefs need not form a doctrinal system. As White likes to say, 
“indoctrinated beliefs could be of any kind whatever” (White 1972b). 
If this is the case, for the purpose of the indoctrination theory, we 
do not need any demarcation criterion in order to separate doctrines 
from science. 
Ivan Snook’s and John White’s strategy to avoid the problems of 
method and content criteria is to connect the concept of indoctrina-
tion solely to the intention of the teacher. Of course, the teacher is 
an indoctrinator when she wants to indoctrinate or manipulate stu-
dents. This type of case is clear (the case of total institution). But how 
many teachers really want to indoctrinate students? Teachers who have 
truly understood the ethical codes of teacherhood have no intention 
of indoctrinating students. So, it is more meaningful to assume that 
the indoctrination happens unintentionally (by the structural causes). 
In this case, the traditional formulation of the intention criterion (see 
White’s definition mentioned earlier) is useless. The intention crite-
rion does not recognise indoctrination that is caused by the institu-
tional or social structures. I presume that in the (post)modern teaching 
situation indoctrination occurs at the level of hidden curriculum (see 
Snyder 1973). No teacher or no educational institution openly and 
intentionally indoctrinates students, although many unreflected atti-
tudes and beliefs (example racist and ethnocentric beliefs that would 
be rejected in the open and critical discourse) are transferred to the 
next generation through education. 
The traditional formulation of the consequence criterion is also 
very problematic. It presumes that an indoctrinated person does not 
change her mind regardless of the counter evidence. But who is to say 
that a person is indoctrinated? Should an “unindoctrinated rational 
person” always change her mind when the counter evidence is pre-
sented? What amount of the counter evidence is need for a “ratio-
nal person” to change her mind? Was Einstein an “indoctrinated per-
son, ” because he did not accept the quantum physics regardless of the 
very reasonable counter evidence presented to him? We could also take 
an example from ethics. If I postulate (and I do not give any rational 
grounds for doing so) that the “categorical imperative is a pure fact of 
Reason”, and I believe it to be so regardless of any counter evidence, 
am I an indoctrinated person? 
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One way to reconstruct a more actual and useful concept of indoc-
trination for a modern teaching situation is to apply Jürgen Habermas’s 
theory of communicative action as Robert Young has done. Young’s 
Habermasian concept of indoctrination opens up some promising per-
spectives, but on the other hand Young’s theory has problems of its 
own. Before focussing on Young’s theory and its problems, we must 
take short look on Habermas’s concept of ideal speech situation and 
his theory of communicative action. 
2.2 Jürgen Habermas on linguistic interaction
2.2.1 The concept of the ideal speech situation
With the concept of the ideal speech situation Habermas is referring 
to the idealized conditions of speech. The ideal speech situation refers 
to the situation where conditions for argumentative action are ide-
als. This means that in the discourse there is no other force than the 
force of better argument. There are no inner or outer restrictions that 
determine the outcome of discourse. Only the force of better argu-
ment determines the speech situation. In the ideal speech situation, 
systematically distorted communication is excluded (Habermas 1984a, 
177). In this imaginative yet factually ideal speech situation it is pos-
sible to gain consensus about all those subjects that generally are dis-
cursive in nature. 
Habermas outlines four conditions for his ideal speech situation: 
(i) All potential participants in discourse must have equal rights 
to use speech acts in such a way that discourse could be per-
manently open to claims and counter claims, questions and 
answers. 
(ii) All participants in discourse must have equal opportunities 
to present interpretations, to present assertions, recommen-
dations, explanations and corrections, and also equal chances 
to problematize (problematisieren) or challenge the validity of 
these presentations, to present arguments for and against. In 
this way all possible critics are visible and no unreflected prej-
udices remains.
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These two conditions facilitate the free discourse and the pure com-
municative action in which 
(iii) participants, by means of presentative speech acts (repräsean-
tative Sprechakte), equally express their attitudes, feelings and 
wishes, and also in which participants are honest to each other 
(sich selbst gegenüber wahrhaftig sind) and make their inner 
nature (intentions) transparent. 
(iv) participants have equal opportunities to order and resist orders, 
to promise and refuse, to be accountable for one’s conduct and 
to demand accountability from others. It is only in this way that 
the reciprocity of actionanticipations (Reziprozität der Verh-
altenserwartungen) is realised (Habermas 1984a, 177178; see 
also Benhabib 1986, 285). 
Habermas claims that no empirical investigation or study could ever 
reveal the facticity of the ideal speech situation, yet it still operates 
within it. It is a simultaneously real element of the discourse and a 
counterfactual standard for actual discourse (Habermas 1984a, 180). 
Later on Habermas simply stops using the notion of the ideal 
speech situation and begins referring to the universal presuppositions 
of argumentation. He starts to speak about “universal conditions of 
possible understanding” and “general presuppositions of communica-
tive action” (Habermas 1979, 1). In his article Discourse Ethics: Notes 
on a Program of Philosophical Justification, Habermas relies on Rob-
ert Alex’s formulation of universal presuppositions of argumentation 
(Habermas 1990, 8889): 
(2.1) Every speaker may assert only what he really believes. 
(2.2) A person who disputes a proposition or norm under discus-
sion must provide a reason for wanting to do so. 
(3.1) Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed 
to take part in a discourse. 
(3.2) a. Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever. b. 
Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into 
the discourse.c. Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, 
desires and needs. 
(3.3) No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, 
from exercising his rights as laid down in (3.1) and (3.2). 
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In this article Habermas says that now he does not want to specify, 
renew or change his former notion of the ideal speech situation (Hab-
ermas 1990, 88). In his book Between Facts and Norms, Habermas 
definitevely leaves the concept of the ideal speech situation behind 
and claims that discussion of “the ideal communication community” 
(Karl-Otto Apel) and “the ideal speech situation” tempts the improper 
hypostatisation of validity claims (Habermas 1996, 323). 
2.2.2 Communicative action and speech acts
At the heart of the theory of communicative action is the vision that 
the modern world-view is differentiated into three parts. This is why 
nowadays there are better opportunities to come to a mutual under-
standing. Following Karl Popper, Habermas distinguishes the objec-
tive world, the social world and the subjective world. A communi-
catively competent speaker can independently present differentiated 
statements concerning any of these three worlds. She can indepen-
dently evaluate any statement about the world with proper validity 
claims. There are three validity claims for these three worlds: 
(i) Truth (Wahrheit). A claim that refers to the objective world is 
valid if it is true, i.e. if it corresponds to the reality. 
(ii) Truthfulness (Wahrhaftigkeit). A claim that refers to the subjec-
tive world is valid if it is honest, i.e. if it has an authentic rela-
tionship with the subjective world. 
(iii) Rightness (Richtigkeit). A claim that refers to the social world 
is valid if it does not contradict commonly agreed social norms 
(Habermas 1984b, 440). 
Let us examine the example of the claim “Teachers have right to prac-
tise indoctrination in schools”. This claim refers to the social world, 
and its proper validity claims is rightness (justice). A communicatively 
competent opponent could challenge this claim by stating that it con-
tradicts that which is commonly considered as morally correct behav-
iour (or it would be commonly considered as such in a free and criti-
cal discourse). If an opponent merely says that “My inner self told me 
that indoctrination is wrong” (truthfulness or authenticity) or “It is 
scientifically proven that indoctrination is wrong” (truth), she is using 
an incorrect validity claim and she is not a communicatively compe-
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tent speaker. So, in this case, the proper validity claim is that of right-
ness or justice. 
To understand why Habermas has placed so much emphasis on the 
demand of mutual understanding, we have to look at Habermas’s the-
ory of social action. First, Habermas divides ideal (pure) types of action 
into the categories of social and non-social action. An object of non-
social action is nature, and the objects of social action are other peo-
ple. According to Habermas, non-social action is always purposivera-
tional instrumental action: the actor makes use of specific objects for 
his or her own benefit. Social action can be either successoriented stra-
tegic action or understandingoriented communicative action. Strategic 
action is purposiverational action oriented toward other persons from 
a utilitarian point of view. The actor does not treat others as genuine 
persons rather, as natural objects. Strategic action means calculative 
exploitation, or manipulation, of others. An actor who acts strategi-
cally is primarily seeking her own ends and manipulates other people 
either openly or tacitly. Communicative action is the opposite of stra-
tegic action. Communicative action  or its pure type  means interper-
sonal communication, which is oriented toward mutual understand-
ing, and in which other participants are treated as genuine persons, 
not as objects of manipulation. Actors do not primarily aim at attain-
ing their own success but want to harmonise their plans of action with 
the other participants (Habermas 1984b, 285; see also p. 333.) 
          Action 
             Orientation
Action 
Situation
Oriented to Success Oriented to 
Reaching  
Understanding
Non-social Instrumental action -
Social Strategic action
Communicative 
action
Figure 3. Pure types of action (Habermas 1984, 285). 
Habermas’s most vulnerable claim is that the tendency toward under-
standing is the immanent telos of speech or the original mode of lan-
guage use. The instrumental use of language (in other words strate-
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gic action) is, according to Habermas, parasitic on the original usage. 
”(…) the use of language with an orientation to reaching understand-
ing is the original mode of language use, upon which indirect under-
standing, giving something to understand or letting something be 
understood, and instrumental use of language in general, are para-
sitic” (Habermas 1984b , 288). To state arguments in support of this 
vulnerable claim, Habermas presents his own interpretations of John 
Austin’s speech act theory. According to Austin, the basic form of a 
speech act is “Mp”. 
I claim, that it is raining
M p
The performance of this basic form of a speech act means that: 
a) The speaker expresses state of affair p (that p), in other words 
execute illocutionary speech act; 
b) The speaker makes a claim, promise, command, avowal etc., in 
other words, execute a locutionary speech acts (which is seen in 
modus “M”) and 
c) by carrying out a speech act the speaker produces an effect upon 
the hearer, in other words, execute a perlocutionary speech act. 
As Austin himself put it: to say something (p), to act in saying 
something (M), to bring about something through acting in say-
ing something (Austin according to Habermas 1981, 289). 
Thus, Habermas claims that locutionary and illocutionary speech acts 
are the original features of language usage. If the speaker wants to achieve 
any kind of perlocutionary effects, she must execute locutionary and illo-
cutionary speech acts in a satisfactory manner. The speaker must achieve 
socalled locutionary and illocutionary aims before reaching at any perlo-
cutionary ends. Habermas thinks that the perlocutionary aspects of speech 
do not belong to “the immanent telos” of the speech act. Perlocution-
ary aspect appears only after people begin to practise instrumental action 
in the linguistic interaction (that is strategic action). When this happens 
locutionary and illocutionary aspects of speech are recruited as a means 
to utilitarian ends (strategic use of language). Strategic action is the kind 
of linguistic interaction in which one or more speaker wants to produce 
perlocutionary effects. As such, only a portion of all linguistic interactions 
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belongs to the category (pure type) of communicative action. The diffi-
cult question is, as will become clear below, whether teaching is commu-
nicative or strategic action. 
2.3 Robert Young’s critical concept of 
indoctrination
In sketching the nonindoctrinative and critical concept of teaching 
and learning, Robert Young constructs the concept of an ideal ped-
agogical speech situation (IPSS). It is based on Habermas’s theory 
of the ideal speech situation (ISS) explained above. It also refers to 
Klaus Mollenhauer’s educational theory (Mollenhauer 1972, 42; see 
also Masschelein 1991, 134-136). Young interprets Habermas in the 
following way: 
The idea of the ISS is a critical reconstruction of the assumptions 
of everyday speech communication. It is argued that these assump-
tions underlie the possibility of speech communication and are uni-
versal (…) When we speak we normally act as if a certain situation 
existed, even though, in fact, it does not. These assumptions are 
contrafactual (…) for without these assumptions there would be 
chaos. The assumptions are: 
(i) that what we are saying or hearing is intelligible, i.e. is coded 
according to the usual rules, etc.; 
(ii) that what we are saying or hearing is true so far as it implies the 
existence of states of affairs.; 
(iii) that the person speaking are being truthful or sincere; 
(iv) and that the things said are normatively appropriate consider-
ing the relationship among the people and between them the 
situation they are in. 
(Young 1989, 75-76) 
For the purpose of ideal pedagogical speech situation, Young defines a per-
locutionary speech act as follows: “Perlocutionary action involves a special 
class of strategic action  that in which illocutions are employed as a means 
to ends other than reaching understanding and freely coordinating action 
plans in the light of validity claims.” (Young 1989, 106). 
Young emphasises that we should not equate perlocutionary utter-
ances with imperative utterances. Imperative utterances form merely 
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one class of perlocutions. This class of imperative utterances admits 
of two subdivisions: 
Imperatives which appeal to known positive or negative sanctions which 
the person in power can control (type 2) and imperatives which appeal 
to a known normative context of legitimate authority (type 1) (…) But 
there exists another general class of perlocutions which might be called 
‘deceptions’ or ‘ulterior purposes’ (type 3). In these, as Strawson has 
shown, a speaker has to succeed in getting a hearer to accept an illocu-
tionary claim in order to succeed in some further purpose, which must 
remain concealed. 
(Young 1989, 106) 
For example, a dishonest car salesman performs speech act type 3 when 
she is trying to persuade the customer (the perlocutive act) to buy a 
faulty car by presenting (illoctionary speech act) false statements (locu-
tionary speech act) about its condition. In this way, the car salesman 
is attempting to successfully achieve a concealed strategic end, the sale 
of a faulty car at a good price. 
With the concept of the ideal pedagogical speech situation, and 
with types 2 and 3 perlocutions, Young develops his own theory of 
indoctrinative teaching: “If the ideal pedagogical speech situation 
(IPSS) is one in which the student is able rationally to assess views 
or, at least, come to hold them in ‘a manner open to rational assess-
ment’, then only those speech acts which are illocutionary but not per-
locutionary (in senses 2 and 3) can characterise the form of action we 
would want to call ‘educational’ rather than ‘indoctrinatory’.” (Young 
1989, 107) Because the difference between “illocutionary and perlo-
cutionary acts (in senses 2 and 3)“ is in the teacher’s intention, we can 
regard Young’s criterion for indoctrination as a communicative version 
of the intention criterion. 
According to Young, it is not possible on the level of empirical prag-
matics to show which teacher’s singular speech acts are legitimate (rep-
resent true education) and which are illegitimate (represent indoctrina-
tion). Perlocutionary intentions become visible in the structure of inter-
action over time. This is the general weakness of any intention criterion. 
Intention criterion focus attention on the teacher-student relationship and 
excludes the aspects of social systems or ideological processes. Young rec-
ognises this weakness, although he does not provide any supplementary 
criterion concerning content or consequence of teaching. 
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2.3.1 Critique of Young’s criterion of indoctrination
Young’s concept of the ideal pedagogical speech situation is problem-
atic. It is based on Habermas’s theory of the ideal speech situation, 
which Habermas has abandoned or revised to something else. Both 
the ideal speech situation and the ideal pedagogical speech situation 
are ambitious attempts to overcome the historicity, the context depen-
dence of all our concepts. The concept of the ideal speech situation 
relies on the assumption that there exists some transcendental language 
game (Karl-Otto Apel), which precedes every actual speech situation. 
I think that these concepts (ISS and IPSS) contain values and pref-
erences of our time, values that I gladly acknowledge. Nevertheless, 
conditions of the ideal speech situation are not properties of the tran-
scendental language game. Attempting to promote these conditions 
to transcendental standards is, however, problematic. 
Due the fact that Young’s criteria of indoctrination is a revised ver-
sion of intention criterion, it has the same limitation that also those 
theories that rely on teacher’s intention as distinctive feature of indoc-
trination. Both traditional intention criterion and Young’s revised ver-
sion do not recognise indoctrination that is caused by social structures 
and indoctrination that occurs at the level of hidden curriculum. In 
these cases it may well be that the teacher never use “perlocutionary 
speech acts in senses 2 and 3” but still some unreflected attitudes and 
beliefs are infiltrated into students’ minds. The teacher’s intentions 
may fulfil any requirements of validity, but some structural mechanism 
could still cause systematically distorted communication in teaching, 
which eventually leads indoctrination of students. 
Another problem is that the teaching is a very special form of 
human interaction, which is why the concept of the ideal speech sit-
uation - and the concept of communicative action as such - may be 
poorly suited to the act of teaching. Is teaching, in its essence, commu-
nicative or strategic action? One could present very convincing argu-
ments in favour of the notion that teaching is not at all communica-
tive action (example Moilanen 1996 and 1998). According to Hab-
ermas, interaction is always strategic if perlocutive aims are involved. 
Where teaching is concerned, one could define didactic aims as perlo-
cutive aims. From this point of view, teaching always remains as a per-
locutionary action (in senses 2 and 3), in which the teacher attempts 
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to influence others (Beeinflussung des Gegenspielers), and the teach-
er’s success can be evaluated by criterion of effectiveness (the validity 
claim of the instrumental and strategic action). In this respect, teach-
ing is always strategic action and teachers undeniably use perlocution-
ary speech acts (in senses 2 and 3). 
One could also claim that teaching cannot be placed along the axis 
of communicativestrategic action (see Oelkers 1983 and Kivelä 1996). 
I would still rely on Habermas’s basic concept of interaction (com-
municative versus strategic action), but in a productive way. I want 
to introduce the concepts of communicative and strategic teaching, 
which are not simple applications of Habermas’s original concepts. I 
follow Jan Masschelein’s strategy to conceive pedagogical action as sim-
ulated communicative action (Masschelein 1991, 145). 
I claim that the issue in the problem of indoctrination is not, the 
question of what kinds of perlocutionary speech acts are legitimate 
(see also Puolimatka 1995, 153). The problem is more complex, and 
other aspects of teaching (content and consequence) should also be 
taken to consideration. 
2.4 The modified Habermasian concept of 
indoctrination
I understand communicative teaching to include value orientations 
in which the teacher commits herself to “universal” presuppositions 
of argumentation and acts in accordance with these maxims as to 
the best of her ability (“normative minimum“; Mollenhauer 1972, 
42). Pedagogical communication is kind of simulated communicative 
action and it is more simulated in early stage of education. When a 
teacher teaches seven years old pupils, the words “to the best of her abil-
ity” have different practical consequence than in the case of a teacher 
teaches twenty years old students. The value orientation is the same, 
but the practise or application of presuppositions of argumentation is 
different. When we understand communicative teaching in this way, as 
an exceptional form of communicative action, the concept of commu-
nicative teaching is looser than the concept of communicative action 
itself. I would like to think that communicative teaching  as an excep-
tional application of communicative action - still remains within the 
realm of communicative action, although teachers sometimes make 
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use of “illegitimate perlutionary speech acts in senses 2 and 3”. I could 
imagine that the amount of perlocutive aims - the degree of simula-
tion of the proper discourse - are higher in elementary school than in 
institutes of higher education, but the value orientation of teaching is 
still the same in both cases. 
In dealing with the dilemma of indoctrination, we should refrain 
from focusing specific attention on the singular speech acts of a teacher. 
When the telos of education is to produce mature and communica-
tively competent people and the content of teaching provides materials 
for independent and critical thinking, then the teacher may use meth-
ods that, when taken out of context, may resemble strategic action and 
the perlocutive use of language (or may de facto be some form of stra-
tegic action depending on how one defines strategic and communi-
cative action). 
In this respect, I have set two parallel criteria for indoctrinative 
teaching: 1) The communicative method and intention criterion; 2) 
The empowering content and consequence criterion. 
2.4.1 The communicative method and intention 
criterion of indoctrination
Like William Kilpatrick, I think that the most important element in 
the non-indoctrinative teaching is the respect for other persons. Hab-
ermas defines the communicative action as a kind of linguistic inter-
action in which one’s fellow man is considered as a genuine person, 
and in which aims and ends of action are decided in an environment 
free and equal discussion. Oppose to this communicative action there 
is the strategic action in which one treat others as a natural object, 
solely as a means to an end. I define the strategic teaching, as the kind 
of teaching in which the teacher treats her students solely as objects, 
as objects of series of didactical manoeuvres. This strategic teaching is 
a form of indoctrination (strategic teaching is not same as indoctrina-
tion), when a teacher tries to transfer teaching content to the students’ 
minds, treating them merely as passive objects, not as active co-subjects 
of the learning process. Then the teaching is in no sense the simulation 
of the communicative action but the pure strategic action. 
I define the communicative teaching, which is based on “The Bil-
dung as a human teaching situation“ (“Bildung als menschlich gültig 
39
Situation“, Schäfer & Schaller 1976, 57) as contradictory to the stra-
tegic teaching. The aim is a communicatively competent student who 
does not need to rely on the teacher, or any other authority for that 
matter. In the communicative teaching, students are not treated as pas-
sive objects but as active learners. In the communicative teaching, a 
teacher and her students co-operatively participate in the formation of 
meanings and new perspectives. In the communicative teaching, the 
teacher does not impose her ideas on the students but rather they make 
a joint effort to find a meaningful insight regarding the issues at hand. 
What I refer to as the communicative teaching very closely corresponds 
with Gert Biesta’s “the practical intersubjectivity in teaching“. Biesta 
does not understand education “as a one way process in which culture 
is transferred from one (already accultured) organism to another (not 
yet accultured), but as a co-constructive process, a process in which 
both participating organism play active role and in which meaning is 
not transferred but produced“ (Biesta 1994, 312). Unlike Biesta, I do 
not consider teaching (no matter how good a teacher is) as a symmet-
rical communicative action. 
The communicative teaching is nearest to the ideal of communi-
cative action that in can get in a real teaching situation. The commu-
nicative teaching is a simulation of communicative action, a simula-
tion of a free and equal discourse. It is also a simulation of democracy 
and democratic mode of action. This means that there could be no 
communicative teaching in the school, if there exits no kind of prac-
tice of a school democracy. Nevertheless, pedagogical action essentially 
remains as an asymmertical relationship, because the teacher and her 
students do not share a common level of communicative competence. 
Only after a person has completed her education (Bildung) is she pre-
pared to engage in the proper communicative action. 
However, even my revised version of the method and intention 
criterion does not recognize the unintentionally or structurally caused 
indoctrination. Let us take example the Hitler Jugend assembly Ger-
many in the 1930’s. No matter how communicatively orientated the 
teacher or the Gruppenlieder was, elements of indoctrination were 
strongly present. The Hitler Jugend was a very effective training insti-
tution, and we cannot gain a comprehensive picture of its operations 
if we restrict our examination to the teachers’ intentions and methods. 
In some teaching situations, no matter what a teacher’s intentions and 
40
methods were, the outcome was still an uneducated (“indoctrinated“) 
person. Thus, it is clear that we need aspects of the content and the 
consequence of teaching. 
2.4.2 The content and consequence criterion of 
empowerment
The starting point in the empowerment content criterion is the con-
structivist view of knowledge (see, for example Berger & Luckmann 
1979 and Young 1992). Nowadays, teaching cannot be based on the 
notion that there exists a group of objective facts, which are deposited 
into students’ minds like money is deposited in a bank. According to 
the constructivist view, knowledge is constructed through social pro-
cesses. Knowledge does not imitate outer reality but rather the system 
of knowledge is a construction of the reality. When the constructiv-
ist nature of knowledge is recognised, higher demands with regard to 
the teaching content are directed. The teaching content should pro-
vide students with opportunities to construct their own creative and 
multi-dimensional view of reality. The teaching content should also 
promote students to engage critical self-reflection. Thus, if we want 
the teaching content to be non-indoctrinative, the teaching content 
should contribute to students’ reflectivity towards those meaning per-
spectives that they have already adopted, and as well as toward those 
that are taught (see Mezirow 1991). The teaching content should not 
provide any easy answers but rather should improve students’ own 
power of judgement and capacity for mature deliberation. I consider 
content that limits students’ meaning perspectives and minimizes as 
opposed to increases students’ own power of judgement as indoctrina-
tive. In the case of indoctrination, the teaching content tends to keep 
students at an immature stage. The non-indoctrinative teaching con-
tent gives students both the freedom and faculty to determine their 
own differentiated identity, worldview and conduct of life. 
The consequence criterion of empowerment is related to the the-
ories of modern identity and reflective modernity (Beck, Giddens & 
Lash 1994). The idea of this criterion is to promote such kind of edu-
cation that contributes to the formation of reflective and relatively 
open identities. In modern societies, identities are open to a certain 
extent. In every society, some part of identity is solid as a result of pri-
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mary socialisation, but in modern societies, the individual tends to 
remain somewhat “incomplete“. The modern individual is conscious 
of her capacity to change her own identity, and she possesses the per-
spective of many possible identities. This relatively open form of iden-
tity produce the pluralisation of life worlds and meaning perspectives. 
People tend to grow up differently in modern societies. This corre-
sponds with the situation that Emile Durkheim called organic solidar-
ity (Durkheim 1984). In the stage of organic solidarity society need 
autonomous, independent, critical and professional individual per-
sonalities. My claim is that if educational institutions tend to system-
atically produce closed identities (which are necessary in a traditional 
society during the stage of mechanical solidarity), we can presume 
that these institutions impose some form of indoctrination. In mod-
ern or post-modern society, educational institutions should encourage 
a reflective attitude toward one’s own identity. 
2.5 Epilogue
Habermas’s theory of communicative action could be a very impor-
tant - but not sufficient - contribution to the theory of indoctrination. 
Robert Young was first to apply Habermas to the theory of indoctri-
nation, but Young’s concept of indoctrination has its own inherent 
problems. Young’s theory concentrates solely on the speech acts of the 
teacher, which should not be the point in the theory of indoctrina-
tion. This is why I present here a revised version of the Habermasian 
concept of indoctrination and I also supplement it with the content 
and consequence criterion of empowerment. I have to say that my cri-
tique toward Young concerns only a small portion of his larger criti-
cal theory of education. With the exception of this concept of indoc-
trination I am very much in agreement with Young. 
My revised Habermasian version of the concept of indoctrination 
requires the application of a proper theory of a subject and its gene-
sis. The question is: How does a human grow into a mature person 
with the capacity for critical self-reflection and self-knowledge? Nei-
ther Habermas’s theory of communicative action (which includes the 
socialisation theory) or the traditional analytic philosophy of educa-
tion (and English sociology of education) provide the theory of a social 
subject. 
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Another problem is the question of power in education. Accord-
ing to Michel Foucault: 
The individual is no doubt the fictitious atom of an ‘ideological’ rep-
resentation of society; but he is also a reality fabricated by this specific 
technology of power that I have called ‘discipline’. 
(Foucault 1992, 194) 
Foucault poses a great challenge to the theory of indoctrination. If the 
Foucaltian illustration is the whole truth about individuality then the 
critique of indoctrination is impossible. My aim is to create a critical 
theory of education that takes into consideration both the aspect of 
freedom and the aspect of power in the process of socialisation. 
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4 ACTION RESEARCH IN THE LIGHT 
OF JüRGEN HABERmAS’S THEORY 
OF  COmmUNICATIVE ACTION AND 
DISCOURSE THEORY OF JUSTICE
An emphasis on democracy is typical of action research. Therefore, the-
ories of modern democracy can be applied within the field of school 
development through action research. According to Jürgen Habermas, 
the promotion of democratic will-formatio n requires the promotion 
of free and rational communicative action that is as free from manip-
ulation as possible. Under ideal communicative conditions, consensus 
is achieved dialectically through the force of a better argument. The 
principles of rational argumentation have been developed in detail 
in Habermas’s publications on discourse ethics and in The Theory of 
Communicative Action. He has recently developed his approach in a 
book entitled Between Facts and Norms, to which theorists o f action 
research have so far paid little attention. In this book Habermas exam-
ines the possibilities for bridging the gap between actual norms and 
social acceptance of norms in modern society. In traditional society 
there was no gap between the facticit y and the validity of a norm. 
In modernity, by contrast, a norm is considered valid only if it has 
been agreed on in free communication between all parties concerned. 
Action research can support the formation of communication mecha-
nisms that advance colle ctive discursive will-formation. In this sense, 
Habermas’s recent theorizing offers interesting viewpoints on action 
research.
Keywords: action research, theory of communicative action, dis-
course ethics, discourse theory of justice, rational collective will-forma-
tion, facticity, validity, school development, curriculum development
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4.1  Introduction
The idea of democracy is a central topic in discussions about action 
research. (Carr & Kemmis 1986; Oja & Smulyan 1989; Zuber-Sker-
ritt 1992; Kemmis 1994; Noffke & Stevenson 1995; Stringer 1996; 
Kemmis & Wilkinson 1998). Therefore, in our o pinion, theories of 
modern democratic society can be applied to action research. A well-
known approach to theorising the different aspects of western democ-
racy is based on the philosophical tradition of critical theory. In this 
presentation we introduce, from the theoretical point of view of mod-
ern law and democracy, a new approach developed by the latest  and 
perhaps the last  remarkable figure of classical critical theory, the Ger-
man philosopher Jürgen Habermas.
Action research is definitely a child of western modernism and the 
Enlightenment. The program of action research seems to have nota-
ble similarities with the project of modernity. Both of them openly 
preach for a better world  for progress and emancipatio n, more dem-
ocratic societies, empowerment of the common people, and so on. 
(Anttonen, Heikkinen & Willman 1998). One of the main tasks of 
critical theory is to develop appropriate theoretical standards for judg-
ing the consequences of modernisation in western democracies  the 
ideas of progress, democracy and emancipation. No wonder, there-
fore, that critical theory has struck a responsive chord in the hearts of 
the action researchers.
Critical theory has been elaborated especially by a group at Deakin 
University, Australia. Within the field of educational action research 
one can hardly find a research report without a reference to the book 
Becoming Critical (1986, originally 1 983), written by Stephen Kem-
mis and Wilfrid Carr. In the book, the theoretical approach to action 
research was based on the latest elaborations of critical theory at the 
time, namely the theory of knowledge and human interests developed 
by Jürgen Hab ermas (1971, originally 1968). This view of action 
research emphasizes the importance of the collaboration, emancipation 
and empowerment of people. In this sense the Deakinian approach is 
close that advocated by Paolo Freire (1970), highlighting the notion 
of cultural action for freedom. 
According to Carr and Kemmis, three different orientations to 
action research can be specified on the basis of three autonomous inter-
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ests of knowledge: technical, practical, and emancipatory. The techni-
cal interest of knowledge, accordin g to Habermas, aims at the mate-
rial reproduction of society, and is closely linked with the positivis-
tic, or sociotechnological, approach to social sciences. Technical action 
research on education aims to increase the efficiency of educational pr 
actice and teachers’ professional development, bringing about more 
effective practices, assessed from the viewpoint of instrumental ratio-
nality. The researcher’s role is that of an outside expert who makes an 
intervention in the society concerned. The pra ctical interest of knowl-
edge is based on the hermeneutical tradition of science; thus, practical 
action research aims to enhance practitioners’ understanding and trans-
form their consciousness. The role of the researcher is a Socratic one, 
encouraging participation and self-reflection. The emancipatory inter-
est of knowledge aims at emancipation from the dictates and coercion 
of ideologies, which are intertwined with the traditions and ‘common 
sense’ in societies. (Carr & Kemmis 1986; Kemmis &a mp; McTag-
gart 1988; Zuber-Skerritt 1992, 12.) 
Emancipatory action research, therefore, empowers the people liv-
ing their lives and working in modern institutions. The emancipatory 
approach aims to transform these organisations and the educational sys-
tem. An emancipatory action researcher feel s inclined to criticize the 
bureaucratisation of social systems. His or her task is to act as a ‘pro-
cess moderator’ who shares responsibility equally with participants. Carr 
and Kemmis (1986, 116117) call the emancipatory approach educational. 
Later it has also been called critical and empowering action research. The 
threefold distribution to technical, practical and emancipatory action 
research has become a raison d’être of action researchers: an access to the t 
eam of ‘real’ action researchers in the dominant action research discourse 
in Anglo-American societies (Jennings & Graham 1996). 
Jürgen Habermas himself, however, made his linguistic turn a long 
time ago and renewed his approach to the so-called linguistic para-
digm, which derives its origin from the philosophy of language, among 
other sources. The new approach was elaborate d in Habermas’s prin-
cipal work, The Theory of Communicative Action (1984, 1987; origi-
nally published in 1981). After this, Habermas has been more cautious 
with the concept of the emancipatory interest of knowledge. In fact, he 
does not even mention the concept in his later production. However, 
in our view, the idea of emancipation can well be applied within the 
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field of action research  including its recent theoretical developments 
because the concept of emancipatory action research is not based on 
the problematic commitments to philosophy of consciousness – Hab-
ermas’s earlier hegelian concepts of reason and freedom. 
Habermas’s theory of communicative action has also been applied 
to action research. Björn Gustavsen’s (1992) version of discourse eth-
ics, elaborated in the concept of democratic dialogue, has become 
familiar to Scandinavian action researchers. Stephe n Kemmis has also 
discussed the theory of communicative action (Kemmis 1995 ab). 
Habermas himself has, however, slightly altered his theoretical appa-
ratus after having published his theory of communicative action. In 
his latest magnum opus, Between Facts and Norms (1996) (orig. Fak-
tizität und Geltung 1992), Habermas develops a theory of modern law 
and justice, based on the ideas presented in the theory of communica-
tive action. In the book, Habermas discusses the possibilities to con sti-
tute legitimate norms in modern society. The new apparatus is closest 
to the philosophy of justice. Therefore, it is no wonder that fairly few 
action researchers have become acquainted with it yet.
The basic conceptual polarity in the book is built between the con-
cepts of validity and facticity. The tension between them is caused by 
the modernisation of society. In traditional society there was no gap 
between the facticity of a norm and its validity ; they were one and the 
same. Social action was based on conventional morals and on mechan-
ical solidarity. People shared a holistic, religio-ethical or cosmological 
world view, transmitted by the chain of tradition, and social integra-
tion was based on the identity of world views. (Durkheim 1964.)
In traditional society, therefore, there was no difference between the 
facticity and the validity of a norm. In modernity, however, the unity 
of law and justice has been eroded. Norms can no longer be founded 
on some kind of shared basis, as they were in the premodern world 
neither on the word of God nor on the will of any ruler or authority. 
Max Weber called the process of the modern pluralisation of world 
views “disenchantment of the world” and the loss of “sacred canopy” 
(Regh 1996, xvii). Nowadays n orms cannot be based on any shared 
religious world view or on the concept of natural law. The social inte-
gration of people in modern societies is based on positive law, in other 
words, on explicit agreements which have to be negotiated between 
people. In modern times, legitimate law is understood only as a result 
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of free and rational communication between all persons concerned. 
Thus, modern societies have moved from conventional morality into 
postconventional morality  or into a posttraditional form of a principled 
morality, as Habermas puts it (1996, 7; 71), applying Lawrence Kohl-
berg’s theory of morality. 
In the modern world norms are founded on democratic and ratio-
nal will-formation. At the same time, however, the legitimation of law 
is becoming more and more complicated. To quote William Regh: 
Modern societies witness an increasing variety of groups and subcul-
tures, each having its own district traditions, values, and worldview. As 
a result, more and more conflicts must be settled by reaching explicit 
agreement on a greater range of contest able matters, under conditions 
in which the shared basis for reaching such agreement is diminishing. 
(Regh 1996, xviixviii.) 
Therefore, to maintain democracy in these conditions, we should 
improve policies which promote as free and open discussion as possible 
free discourse (Diskurs) in the Habermasian sense. In other words, we 
should improve our practices so as to bridge the growing gap between 
legitimation and actual norms in society. As the shared basis for reach-
ing a consensus is diminishing, we should try to find practices through 
which we could act more discursively. In our view, action research 
could be o ne way of supporting the formation of communication 
mechanisms that advance collective discursive will-formation.
Therefore, the discourse theory of law could be useful for action 
researchers as well. Habermas’s new theoretical developments seem to 
offer us new opportunities within action research projects and thus help 
us enhance democracy. But before entering the f ield of action research, 
understood as a rational democratic process, we will take a look at the 
main elements of the theory of communicative action, which are applied 
and further developed in the discourse theory of law. 
4.2 The basics of the theory of communicative 
action and discourse ethics 
At the heart of the theory of communicative action is the concept 
of communicative action itself. It means interpersonal communication 
which is oriented towards mutual understanding and in which other 
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participants are treated as genuine persons, not as objects of manipu-
lation. Actors do not primarily aim at their own success but want to 
harmonize their action plans with the other participants. Opposite to 
communicative action is the concept of strategic action, which means 
calculative ex ploitation, or manipulation, of others. An actor who acts 
strategically seeks primarily his or her own ends and manipulates other 
people either openly or tacitly. (Habermas 1984a, 285; see also p. 333.) 
          Action 
             Orientation
Action 
Situation
Oriented to Success Oriented to 
Reaching  
Understanding
Non-social Instrumental action -
Social Strategic action
Communicative 
action
 
Figure 4. The ideal types of action according to Habermas (1984a, 285).
Figure 1 above illustrates the dimensions of the concepts of commu-
nicative, strategic and instrumental action. The action is divided into 
nonsocial action, which is oriented to nature, and social action, which 
refers to interact ion with people in the social sphere. According to 
Habermas, nonsocial action is always purposive-rational instrumen-
tal action: the actor makes use of specific objects for his or her own 
benefit. Social action can be either success-oriented strategic acti on 
or understanding-oriented communicative action. Strategic action is 
purposive-rational action oriented toward other persons from a util-
itarian point of view. The actor does not treat others as genuine per-
sons but as natural objects.
Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorono (1972), in their book 
Dialectic of Enlightenment, maintain that the rationalisation of soci-
ety means above all the growth and expansion of instrumental ratio-
nality or, in Habermasian terms, the growth of strateg ic action. Hab-
ermas’s view is a bit more optimistic. He states that modernisation pro-
motes both strategic and communicative rationalisation.
The evolution of communicative rationality presupposes the ratio-
nalisation and differentiation of world views. This means that the world 
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(or our view of it) is dividing into three parts: the objective world, the 
social world, and the subjective world. A c ommunicatively compe-
tent speaker can independently present differentiated statements con-
cerning any of these three worlds. He or she can independently evalu-
ate any statement about the world according to any of the three proper 
validity claims:
1) Truth (Wahrheit). A claim that refers to the objective world is 
valid if it is true, i.e. if it corresponds to reality.
2) Truthfulness (Wahrhaftigkeit). A claim that refers to the sub-
jective world is valid if it is honest, i.e. if it has an authentical 
relationship with the subjective world. Questions like these are 
dealt with in the so-called practical discourse.
3) Rightness (Richtigkeit). A claim that refers to the social world 
is valid if it does not contradict commonly agreed social norms 
(Habermas 1984b, 440).
In his discourse ethics, Habermas analyses presuppositions that make 
conversation possible in general. From these presuppositions he 
deduces two normative principles of discourse which have to be ful-
filled in actual practical discourse if its result  a n orm, rule, or bill  is 
to be considered valid. The universal presuppositions Habermas has 
borrowed from Robert Alexy are the following:
(2.1) Every speaker may assert only what he really believes.
(2.2) A person who disputes a proposition or norm under discus-
sion must provide a reason for wanting to do so. (Habermas 
1995, 88.)
In addition to these, Habermas argues, we need what he calls a rule 
of openness.
(3.1) Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed 
to take part in a discourse.
(3.2) a. Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever.
b. Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever 
into the discourse.
c. Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires, and 
needs.
(3.3) No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coer-
cion, from exercising his rights as laid down in (3.1) and (3.2). 
(ibid., 89)
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From these rules Habermas deduces two principles of discourse ethic: 
the universality principle U and the discourse principle D. In the prac-
tical discourse principle U is fulfilled when 
All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general 
observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s 
interests (and these consequences are preferred to those of known alter-
native possibilities for regulation) (ibid, 65). 
The purpose of the universality principle is to support the tendency 
of interest generalization. By means of the universal principle, Haber-
mas wants to encourage the participants in the practical discourse to 
take the view of another person, to engage in a universal exchange of 
roles, which G. H. Mead called ideal role taking or universal discourse 
(ibid., 65). The aim of the practical discourse is to find such a norm 
that everyone can approve regardless of race, sex, age, world view, or 
even existence  meaning that we should take the generations to come 
into account. The universal principle helps us in the quest for a valid 
norm in the light of consequences and side effects which can be antic-
ipated at a given moment. 
Another principle that Habermas puts forward is the discourse 
principle D: 
Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with 
the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practi-
cal discourse. (ibid., 66). 
This principle is also founded on universal presuppositions of argu-
mentation. It deals with the procedures of practical discourse. In fact, 
Habermas says that this procedure actually is practical discourse. 
According to him, this principle is for mal because it does not pro-
vide any substantive guidelines but only sets the procedure for prac-
tical discourse:
Practical discourse is not a procedure for generating justified norms but 
a procedure for testing the validity of norms that are being proposed and 
hypothetically considered for adoption. That means that practical dis-
courses depend on content brought to them from outside (ibid., 103). 
There is no point in engaging in a practical discourse outside the life-world 
of a specific social group or society in a specific time and place.
This principle also demands that if the validity basis of a factual 
norm disappears in the course of time  perhaps as a result of some 
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unexpected side effects  a new practical discourse must be set up fol-
lowing principle U. In his discourse ethics Haber mas does not tell us 
how we should organize practical or legislative discourse for it to rea-
lise principle D, but in his discourse theory of justice he does precisely 
this. In it he constructs an ideal model of legislation which allows the 
gap be tween facticity and validity be bridged. 
4.3 Action research between facticity and validity 
 
In Between Facts and Norms Habermas “goes on to develop a yardstick 
for evaluating modern society”, to quote Kaarlo Tuori (1993a, 2). In 
the book, Habermas further develops themes which have already been 
expressed in the theory of communicative a ction and discourse ethics. 
He focuses his attention on the question of how valid action norms are 
possible in a democratic Rechtstaat (constitutional state). For this pur-
pose he develops a conceptual tension between facticity (Faktizität) a 
nd validity (Geltung).
The criterion of the validity of norms is the discourse principle D. In 
Between Facts and Norms Habermas just gives a slightly different formu-
lation to the principle: 
Just those action norms are valid to which all possible affected persons 
could agree as participants in rational in rational discourse (Habermas 
1996, 107). 
With the concept of “rational discourse” Habermas wants to empha-
size that validity can be gained only in a discourse that “takes place 
under conditions of communication that enable the free processing of top-
ics and contributions, information and reasons in the public space consti-
tuted by illocutionary obligation” (Habermas 1996, 10). A totally new 
aspect here is that Habermas allows some bargaining in practical dis-
courses, but only under the strict regulation of discursively grounded 
procedures. But the core of discourse ethics remains the same; valid-
ity means procedures implied by principle D.
The facticity of a norm refers to different kinds of factual norms. 
All the laws in a modern state that have been enacted in the right order 
have a factual status. But the concept of facticity is broader: There are 
factual norms which have not been written down, which have a status 
of de facto social acceptance and possess social validity (soziale Geltung) 
(Regh 1996, xvi; Habermas 1996, 29; 69). Facticity covers unwritten 
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laws, law-like customs and habits as well. A norm is factual if it has 
imperative power. On the basis of a factual norm, a person who breaks 
the rule can be punished, or at least criticized. 
In schools, for instance, the facticity of norms is explicitly expressed 
in the curriculum. It has a factual status which lays down the terms 
which have to be followed in schools. But the written curriculum is not 
the one and only factual norm. There are a lot of implicit action norms, 
which have a factual status. The hidden curriculum consists of factual 
norms, in spite of the fact that they are not explicitly expressed any-
where (see Broady 1982; Giroux & Purpel 1983). The validity of these 
norms i s based on the de facto social acceptance, however undemo-
cratically the facticity may have been achieved.
The closer the practices of the society are to the ideals of democ-
racy, the narrower is the gap between facticity and validity. In an ideal 
situation, only valid action norms become factual, achieved through 
democratic discursive will-formation, and enact ed following the dis-
course principle mentioned earlier. In reality such conditions are never 
achieved for several reasons. One reason is that we do not know all the 
possible consequences of a norm at the moment it is enacted; we can-
not conceive of all the possible concrete situations in which the norm is 
going to be applied. Another reason for the inevitable tension between 
facts and norms is that the communicative action between those con-
cerned never realizes perfectly the validity claims mentioned above. As 
Jack Mezirow (1990, 11) puts it: 
In reality, the consensus on which we depend to validate expressed ideas 
almost never approximates the ideal. We never have complete informa-
tion, are seldom entirely free from external or psychic coercion of some 
sort, are not always open to unfamiliar and divergent perspectives, may 
lack the ability to engage in rational and critically reflective argumenta-
tion, seldom insist that each participant have their freedom and equal-
ity to assume the same roles in the dialogue (to speak, challenge, critiq 
ue, defend), and only sometimes let our conclusions rest on the evidence 
and on the cogency of the arguments alone.
Thus, the basis of validity of factual action norms is always imper-
fect and unfinished. The consensus achieved through communicative 
action is always provisional. Therefore, there is an inevitable tension 
between the facticity and the validity of acti on norms. The tension is 
illustrated in the following figure: 
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Figure 5. The tension between factual action norms and the validity in 
rational democratic will-formation (Habermas 1996, 9091; see also Regh 
1996, xvixvii; ).
In his discourse theory of justice, Habermas differentiates the discourse 
principle into the moral principle and the democracy principle. The 
moral principle measures the legitimacy of norms, and the democ-
racy principle measures the legitimacy of positive justice (Tuori 1993a, 
11). Here the moral principle serves the same function as principle U, 
discussed earlier (Habermas 1992, 140). Now the democracy princi-
ple has actually been converted into the discourse principle of justice. 
Only those laws and stat utes are legitimate that are legislated accord-
ing to the democracy principle. In other words, the moral principle 
concerns the moral validity of the norms, and the democracy princi-
ple concerns the legitimacy of laws and statutes. The processual nature 
of the democracy principle is illustrated in the model of rational polit-
ical will-formation below:
VALIDITY
“ What kind of
action norms are
valid?”
• The consensus 
conserning the valid 
action norms, achieved 
democratically through
rational, open and free
discussion between the
parties conserned, 
following the discourse 
principle.
FACTICITY
“ What do the
actual action norms
truly say?”
• The conclusiveness of
the action norms, which
guide the expectations of
the actors and,
therefore, create the
necessary conditions for
social interaction.
• The laws and
statutory regulations,
administrative rules
and de-facto-socially
accepted practices
having a factual status.
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Figure 6. A process model of ideal rational political will-formation (Hab-
ermas 1996, 168).
The process begins with the pragmatic discourses in which useful 
means to given aims are considered. Habermas writes: 
Pragmatic discourses extend only to the construction of possible pro-
grams and estimation of their consequences ( ibid., 165). 
If a plan proves to be useful and there is no conflict of interest or values 
involved, the process continues directly to the moral discourses where the 
proposed action norm is subordinated to the test of moral discourses. 
If the proposed action norm (a recommended rule, a bill, a norm, 
etc.) seems to be problematic because of the diversity of interests, 
the process continues with procedurally regulated bargaining (ver-
fahrensregulierte Verhandlungen)
between success-oriented parties who are willing to cooperate. Bargain-
ing aims at compromises the participants find acceptable under three 
conditions. Such compromises provide for an arrangement that a) is 
more advantageous to al l than no arrangements whatever, b) excludes 
free riders who withdraw from cooperation, and c) excludes exploited 
parties who contribute more to the cooperative effort than they gain 
from it (ibid., 165166). 
Procedurally
regulated 
bargaining
Pragmatic discourses
Ethical-political 
discourses
Moral discourses
Legal discourses
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This bargaining is a kind of trading of benefits in the spirit of fair play. 
The purpose of regulated bargaining is to solve an y conflicts of inter-
ests in a way that all concerned can approve. The bargaining is regu-
lated and restricted strategic action, where the parties engage in com-
munication to gain a satisfactory negotiated settlement.
When the proposed action norm proves to be problematic from 
the point of view of value disagreement, ethical-political discourses 
should be opened up. In these discourses the community discusses 
the values which are worthy of united effort. The pur pose is to clar-
ify those values by which people experience solidarity in a given his-
torical form of life. The ethical-political discourse 
engages the participants in a process of self-understanding by which they 
become reflectively aware of deeper co nsonances (Übereinstimmungen) 
in a common form of life (Habermas 1996, 165). 
Ethical-political discourses clarify those values which constitute the 
collective identity of a political community (Tuori 1993b, 133). 
The purpose of the moral discourses is to confirm that the action 
norm does not conflict with the demand of general izable interest. The 
purpose of the moral discourses is to guarantee that the achieved con-
sensus on the proposed action norm accords with the private interests 
of all concerned and that the world views or ethical commitments of 
any party are no t excessively violated. If the result of earlier discourses 
is not consistent with the generalizable interest, the ethical-political 
discourses or procedurally regulated bargaining should be resumed. 
If the proposed action norm is consistent with the comm on interest, 
the process continues into legal discourses. In these discourses between 
juridical experts the internal consistence of the combination of action 
norms is checked. All the resolutions of earlier phases have to be tested 
for legal cohere nce and certainty. This phase is indispensable because 
political legislature may use its lawmaking powers to justify only those 
norms (or legal programs) that are compatible with the existing legal 
system or the corpus of established laws (Habermas 1996, 168).
4.4 Action research in schools as rational 
democratic will-formation 
The process model of rational political will-formation has originally 
been developed to describe the process of making laws. The model can 
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also be applied to participatory action research. As illustrated above, 
the earlier paradigms of Habermas’s producti on have been applied in 
action research quite successfully. The concepts of facticity and valid-
ity and the inevitable tension between them help disclose some new 
aspects of democratic will-formation in schools.
The better the discourse principle can be followed in discussions 
about ways of developing primary education, the narrower is the gap 
between the facticity and the validity of the curriculum. Curriculum 
planning in schools resembles the model of rational collective will-for-
mation. This is especially clear in Finland, where a lot of work for the 
development of the curriculum is being done in schools. The status 
of the curriculum in schools can be compared to the status of law in 
societies: it is a collecti on of official documents which define norms 
of action and regulate social integration. Therefore, as illustrated in 
Figure 4, developing a curriculum is like enacting a law in a modern 
society, but on a miniature scale.
 As we discuss ways of developing primary education, a pragmatic 
discourse is being performed. We ask the question: What should be 
done in schools? The result of the discourses  a provisional consensus 
is being crystallized both in t he official curriculum and in the actual 
practices in schools. Thus, the different aspects of facticity and valid-
ity can be distinguished in the curriculum in precisely the same way 
as in the legal system.
According to the national directives for curriculum development 
in Finnish schools, the laying out of the curriculum should start with 
a discussion of the basic values on which school education is based. In 
other words, the pragmatic discourse preconceive s ethical-political dis-
courses about basic values. In these discourses, we ask ourselves:
What are the values on which the practices in schools are based on?
Curriculum development also includes stages of procedural regulated 
bargaining between the different parties. There are several groups 
which take part in these negotiations in accordance with their special 
interests, such as teachers, who present their own viewpoints on the 
subjects or branches of science in the curriculum. The negotiations 
between different groups are accomplished through strategic action, 
as described in section II above. The idea of procedural regulated bar-
gaining does not req uire adherence to the strictest possible demands 
of communicative action. The parties may choose arguments that are 
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advantageous to them and act strategically towards each other. How-
ever, according to the ideal model of political will-formation, the negot 
iations are procedurally regulated: every party has an opportunity to 
enter claims, and they have to be taken into account.
Figure 7. The process model of rational collective will-formation in de-
veloping a curriculum through action research.
All the results achieved in previous stages of will-formation still have 
to be checked. The outcomes have to be accepted in moral discourses, 
PROCEDURALLY
REGULATED BARGAINING
- combining the different interests
through procedurally regulated
strategic action -
• “How can we take interests of
different interest groups into account
(teachers, parents, etc.)?”
PRAGMATICAL DISCOURSES
- discussion of the practices in the school -
• “What should be done in the school?”
ETHICAL-POLITICAL 
DISCOURSES
- establishing the values 
through communicative action -
• “What are the values on which the
practices in the school is based on?”
MORAL DISCOURSES
- considering the action norms in the light of generaliz-
eralizeable interests -
• “Can all the parties concerned accept
the final outcome as their own interests?”
LEGAL DISCOURSES
- the compatibility of action norms -
• “How integrated a whole is the combination of all the
factual action norms; including all the factual laws,
statutes, statutory regulations, directives
and the curricula of other schools?”
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where the action norms are considered in the light of generalizable 
interests. In moral discourses in schools we ask ourselves the ques-
tion: “Does the final outcome of the earlier discourses promote such 
interests that are generalizable, so that all parties concerned can accept 
them as their own?” In schools such discussions are taking place, 
inter alia, at meetings of teaching staff and of the school board.
In the final stage, the curriculum goes through legal discourses. 
The compatibility of the combination of action norms in the curricu-
lum has to be checked. In juridical discourses we ask ourselves: “How 
integrated a whole is the combination of all the factual action norms, 
including all the factual laws, statutes, statutory regulations, directives 
and the curricula of other schools?” If any contradictories or incom-
patibilities are detected, some part of the whole has to be adjusted: a 
new process of discourses has to be launched. 
The process of making legitimate action norms never ends. Com-
bining different norms and negotiating about them is an unending 
process. The basis of validity of factual action norms is always imper-
fect and unfinished, and the consensus achieved through the process is 
always provisional. The inevitable gap between the facticity and valid-
ity of action norms remains, but the tension between them is at the 
same time a source of a new processes of will-formation.
4.5 Conclusions: towards a more sophisticated 
theory of democracy in action research? 
 
Between Facts and Norms can be regarded as a concession in Habermas’s 
ambitious discourse ethical project. In his earlier theorizing, Haber-
mas strictly held to the validity claims of truth, truthfulness and right-
ness in the theoretical dev elopments of discourse ethics and the the-
ory of communicative action. Strategic action had been relegated to 
the status of a parasite in his idea of communication. Now, however, 
he ‘accepts’ the role of strategic action within certain limits within the 
co ncept of procedurally regulated bargaining. Thus, the result seems 
more realistic than his earlier theoretical models, which had illustrated 
more ideal situations for communication.
In everyday practices, we cannot close our eyes to actual strategic 
negotiations between interest groups. Therefore, in our opinion, the 
process model of rational political will-formation seems fruitful for 
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action researchers. It helps us take the forms o f strategic action into 
account in theorising about action research in actual conditions. Thus, 
the reconstructed version of the theory of communicative action  the 
discourse theory of law  allows us to delineate a more realistic model 
of democracy in a ction research.
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